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Although the CPF system is a critical component of social and economic policy that 
underpins many different areas such as housing, education, family, manpower and labour, it 
has more often than not been but a „side-note‟ within sociological analysis of welfare regimes 
and social policy. Hence, this dissertation contributes to existing literature by systematically 
examining the rationalities behind the emergence and evolution of the CPF in Singapore, from 
a perspective that views it as a mechanism of social control of individuals‟ finance for 
collective social and economic goals. The aims and contributions of this dissertation can hence 
be summarized as 1) to uncover the social historical processes and rationalities that led to the 
formation and subsequent evolution of the CPF from initially being a retirement plan, to 
gradually expand to include housing, healthcare, education, and investments; 2) to examine the 
coercive and ideological aspects of social control as manifested by the various developments 
within the CPF system that enabled it to be both fiscally sustainable and economically 
productive in accordance to developmental goals. A key argument presented here is that it is 
not necessarily social welfare goals that have driven the developments in the CPF system, but 
more often economic and market development problems that have driven its evolution as a 
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Chapter 1: The CPF as the Central Mechanism in the Social 
Control of Personal Finance 
1.1 Introduction 
Under a capitalist system of production and consumption, personal finance, or 
the ways one spends the wages of his/her labor, is usually understood by studies on 
consumption as the final frontier of freedom, agency and choice. How has this 
freedom been intruded? Singapore has been noted as one of the most socially 
regulated societies (Harding and Carter 2003: 192) and one where social control is 
pervasive in every sphere of social life (Tremewan 1996). And the political leadership 
is certainly not bashful about adopting such an intrusively interventionist stance: 
“I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yet, if I did 
not, had I not done that, we wouldn‟t be here today. And I say without the 
slightest remorse, that we wouldn‟t be here, we would not have made 
economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters – who 
your neighbor is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what 
language you use. We decide what is right. Never mind what the people think. 
That‟s another problem.” (Lee Kuan Yew, National Day Rally 1986 in 
Tremewan 1996: 2) 
Sociologically, what has been identified as the primary mechanisms of social 
control, namely, public housing, a state controlled education system, parliament and 
the coercive force of the law, have been critically examined by Tremewan (1996). 
However, a crucial mechanism of social control, one that is perhaps even more 
intrusive, directly coercive, and ideologically effective but taken for granted, the 
Central Provident Fund (CPF), remains to be thoroughly and critically investigated. 
The primary state apparatus involved in the social control of personal financial 
conduct in Singapore is the CPF.  Implemented in the midst of perilous circumstances 
during 1955, the CPF began as a mechanism by which the state enforced compulsory 
savings for funding an individual‟s retirement. Since then, the CPF has evolved into a 
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comprehensive „all-in-one‟ state-managed social security apparatus, one that controls 
and directs a major proportion of an individual‟s income towards state-approved 
expenditure items which includes housing, healthcare, disability and mortgage 
insurance, education loans and investments for retirement. CPF contribution rates 
reached a peak of 50 percent in 1984-1985 before retreating to the present 
contribution rate of 34.5 percent, with 20 percent contributed by the employee and 
14.5 percent by the employer, up to a maximum monthly salary ceiling of $4,500. As 
such, even after several rounds of reduction in contribution rates, slightly more than a 
third of an individual‟s income is still coercively channeled into this compulsory 
savings program with state defined withdrawal options according to the social-
economic objectives of the ruling elite.  
Certain aspects of the CPF have been examined by social scientists; however 
these have generally taken for granted the apparent consensus and compliance to this 
administrative and ideological mechanism of social control. This dissertation attempts 
a critical historical analysis of the CPF to uncover its emergence and evolution, with 
the purposes of disputing the naturalness and apparent consensus towards its present 
form, and to examine the discursive and material shifts within particular historical 
junctures which led to its evolution from a simple provident fund to a comprehensive 
state-managed apparatus that controls and directs a major proportion of individuals‟ 
income towards state-approved expenditure items.  
Hence the key research questions pursued here are, firstly, why and how did the 
CPF evolve from a simple retirement fund into a multi-faceted all-encompassing 
social security mechanism? And secondly, how was the State able to achieve and 
maintain societal acceptance for such an intrusive and coercive program which 
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involves controlling a significant portion of an individual‟s income? This dissertation 
thus seeks to contribute to the literature on the CPF which has thus far been sporadic 
at best, by viewing the CPF as a „mechanism for social control‟, but without its 
conventional pejorative overtones. The social control of individuals‟ finances through 
the CPF serves not only to absolve, or at least alleviate the State of financial 
responsibilities in social security provision; but in Singapore‟s case, it has also 
produced tangible benefits particularly in housing provision and as the basis of the 
nation‟s financial reserves. Three interrelated aspects of social control is emphasized 
within this dissertation: 1) the directly coercive aspect through legislative actions and 
bureaucratic enforcement; 2) the ideological aspect through indirect and subtle means 
which seek to internalize self-discipline and subscription to the State‟s rationalities; 
and 3) the productive aspect where CPF funds are collectively mobilized for 
governmental goals of economic development.  
Methodology  
        This dissertation uses an in-depth historical analytical approach mainly involving 
archival research with primary data sources. 82 volumes of the Official Records of 
Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates (SLAD) spanning from 1955 to 2006 were 
meticulously physically examined in relation to the CPF, while information 
technology aided in the last 4 volumes which were made available online since 
November 2006 via http://www.parliament.gov.sg/parlweb/hansard_search_latest.jsp. 
Additionally, 22 issues of CPF Chairman‟s Statement and Accounts (1955-1976), 31 
issues of CPF Annual Report (1977-2007), and 18 issues of HDB Annual Reports 
(1960-1977) were carefully scrutinized. Secondary sources which consisted of works 
of notable historians and academics were also consulted in tandem.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Welfare Capitalism in East Asia 
Due to the stunning economic growth and successes of the four East Asian 
economies, namely, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, there has 
emerged substantial academic work examining its associated phenomenon of the 
“East Asian Welfare Capitalism” (e.g., Goodman et al. 1998; Ramesh and Asher 
2000; Holliday 2000; Holliday & Wilding 2003; Ramesh 2004; Walker and Wong 
2005; Aspalter 2006; Lee et al 2007; Schmidt 2008). Schmidt (2008: 311) succinctly 
summarizes the key points of this literature by highlighting 8 key characteristics of 
East Asian social policy regimes as, 1) fairly residual, offering only limited 
constitutional protection, 2) barely socially redistributive and therefore also 3) 
strongly status maintaining, 4) investment rather than consumption oriented, 5) 
predominantly regulatory, 6) commodifying rather than decommodifying, 7) 
pragmatically devised and continuously modified rather than principle-driven, and 8) 
lean yet effective and successful. In addition, Schmidt concludes that there is growing 
convergence in the design of welfare regimes of socio-economically advanced 
countries of Europe and Asia due to adaptations to similar environmental conditions 
and mutual learning across regime types and world regions. 
While White and Goodman (1998) reject the concept of a homogeneous 
overarching East Asian welfare model as they argue that the differences in policies 
and institutions between these societies are too large to justify a viable coherent 
classification; Holliday and Wilding (2003: 14-15) argue for an extension of Esping-
Andersen‟s (1990) three worlds of welfare capitalism and the addition of a fourth, 
„productivist‟ world to add to the liberal, social democratic and conservative worlds. 
Productivism refers to the position where welfare and social policy is subordinated to 
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economic goals and is utilized as an aid to further economic development (Holliday 
2000). Welfare that is supportive to the economy flourishes, while welfare that does 
not contribute to economic development languishes (Holliday and Wilding 2003: 13). 
This „productivist‟ world primarily describes Asia‟s tiger economies, but attempts to 
shift the emphasis away from its geographical label to viewing this grouping as a 
group of newly industrialized economies that happen to be in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Instead of a „model‟ which suggests impossible precision and similarity, Holliday and 
Wilding prefer the term „world‟ in order to capture the empirical realities in its 
breadth and imprecision, and to allow for sub-worlds within the productivist world, 
but still emphasizing on the „productivist‟ rationality which is deeply embedded 
within these successful capitalist systems (ibid 15).  
1.2.2 The „Sub-World‟ of Singapore and the CPF System 
It must however be noted that the studies and resulting debates about the East 
Asian welfare capitalism have usually operated at a fairly general level and have been 
found to be frequently lacking in the necessary empirical details (ibid 10). Within the 
productivist „sub-world‟ of Singapore, the primary mechanism of social security and 
welfare provision is the CPF system. One of the earlier works to comment on ironical 
nature of a social security systems across different societies, Asher (1985: 38) 
highlights the paradoxical situation where in Singapore, the paternalistic government 
adopts a social security system, the CPF which places the responsibility almost solely 
on the individual; while in Western countries, social security has been an entrenched 
responsibility of the State despite the fact that freedom of individual choice is highly 
regarded within such societies.  
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Although initially conceived as a provident fund for retirement provisions, it has 
since evolved substantially into a chimera-like system. The multi-faceted mechanism 
which the CPF has evolved into is attested by the variety of descriptions ascribed to it 
by social scientists who have referred to it as „a social security scheme‟ (Low and Aw 
1997, 2004), a „compulsory savings scheme‟ (Ramesh 2001: 427; Lee 2007: 13; 
Schmidt 2008: 318), a „rudimentary pension scheme‟ which nobody deems is 
adequate for decent retirement provisions (Schmidt 2008: 318), „a macroeconomic 
tool to promote economic well-being‟ (Lee 2007: 14), „a central element in housing, 
health and education policy‟ (Ku 2003: 131-132) and a „key instrument of social 
policy‟ (Lian 2008: 36). In a study aimed at using a case study of the CPF to offer 
suggestions to countries looking at undertaking pension reforms, Asher (1999) gives a 
brief overview of the many schemes which have evolved within the CPF system and 
notes the limitations which arise as a result of its present multi-functional nature.  
The primary limitation of the CPF, and one which much of the literature on the 
CPF has aptly and consistently highlighted, is the inadequacy of the CPF in providing 
for a decent standard of retirement living (Ramesh 1992; Asher 1991, 1996, 1999; 
Ramesh 2004: 73; Chan 2008: 86-87; Schmidt 2008: 318). Asher (1991) was the 
earliest to evaluate the CPF scheme in relation to social adequacy and equity. He 
concluded that the arrangements at that point were inadequate and the inadequacy 
would increase due to Singapore‟s affluence and demographic characteristics. Asher 
advocated for modest social insurance elements to be incorporated to improve social 
adequacy, equity and efficiency without drastically overburdening governmental 
finances (ibid 43). Ramesh (2004) goes on further to suggest that income-maintenance 
function is peripheral to the CPF, as among the 4 Asian tigers, although the CPF has 
near-universal coverage and high contribution rates, it is arguably the most inadequate 
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system of income maintenance. This inadequacy is attributed to 3 factors; the low rate 
of return that members earn on their funds, the availability of a variety of pre-
retirement withdrawal schemes, and the absence of any redistributive mechanism 
within the CPF system (ibid 74). In addition, Chan (2008: 87) highlighted the 
significant cohort differences in CPF coverage with a much higher percentage of 
those aged 55 to 59 years old in 1995 covered by the CPF (52%) as compared to those 
aged 70-79 (25%) or those aged over 80 (14%). As such, this generation of elderly is 
less likely to depend on CPF savings for old age and more likely to rely on familial 
support. Gender differences are also pronounced as elderly females are particularly 
reliant on family members given their lower levels of labor force participation over 
their life course and their relatively lower formal educational qualifications (Ramesh 
2004: 73 and Chan 2008: 87-88).  
This inadequacy in providing for income-maintenance however must take into 
account the CPF‟s remarkable success in enabling home-ownership, or what Lee 
(2007:15) terms as the „world‟s first property-based welfare system‟. While, the 
majority of CPF members are „assets rich, cash poor‟, they are still asset rich, and 
should monetary capital be exhausted, arrangements can be made to monetize the 
value held in their properties. Indeed ground sentiment reveals that many citizens 
refer to their properties as their retirement fund. However, the viability of this 
property-based welfare system is dependent on the continued growth of the property 
prices, which in turn is largely dependent on sustained economic growth.  
Highlighting the PAP‟s successful housing program, the remarkable social-
political impact of the connection between the CPF and Housing and Development 
Board (HDB) has been noted by several scholars. Lian (2008: 36-37) aptly described 
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this tie-up as a “landmark development in the construction of Singapore society, once 
it is viewed as part of a coherent strategy in social policy formation”. The State played 
a key role in tilting economic resources in favor of the public housing system (HDB) 
by allowing the CPF to act as the „financing and resourcing intermediaries‟ (Pugh 
1989: 842). The resulting effect of this linkage between CPF and housing/resettlement 
policies is the effective disciplining and proletarianization of labor as workers now 
needed to secure regular wages in order to meet regular monthly mortgage payments 
(Hill and Lian 1995: 120-139); Tremewan 1996: 53-55 ). In addition, Chua‟s (1997) 
seminal piece, Political Legitimacy and Housing, highlighted the notion of 
engendering stakeholding by creating a successful public housing program through a 
„closed circuit of housing funding and consumption‟ between the CPF and HDB when 
in 1968, CPF savings were allowed to be utilized to purchase HDB flats (ibid 22). A 
successful housing program thus created a generation of „home-owners‟ and this 
greatly established the political legitimacy of the PAP State (Chua 1997; Low and Aw 
1997, 2004: 91-92). Additionally, Tan (2004: 135) notes that the CPF scheme 
together with the other measures such as recession „rescue‟ packages suggests that 
“welfare provisions, in general, and social security and pension funds, in particular, 
do not necessarily entail imposing high tax rates and borrowing from future 
generations.” This hence demonstrates an effective balance between state welfarism 
and individual responsibility where “the majority of the citizens are able to respond to 
opportunities provided by the market economy and the state” (ibid). 
 However, the historical emergence and subsequent evolution of the CPF has 
seldom been critically examined across the decades since its establishment. The 
majority of literature on welfare capitalism in East Asia has usually taken a „cross-
sectional‟ approach at examining the CPF system. These studies take into account 
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only its functionalities and rationalities at the particular time of writing and neglect 
the significance of the CPF‟s historicity in explaining its eventually chosen 
developmental trajectory. One exception is Low and Aw (1997 and 2004) who 
provided an overview of the historical process of the developments in the CPF during 
its formative years. Paying particular attention with regards to housing, investment 
and education, Low and Aw (1997) provided an account of the various developments 
in the CPF‟s history and evaluated its implications for Singapore‟s social security, 
macroeconomics and socio-politics. This was followed by an update in Low and Aw 
(2004) which examined developments and trends in the field of social security and 
further examined the CPF‟s limitations in the new millennium due to the newly 
globalized economy. Specifically, Low and Aw advocate for some measure of 
delinking the CPF from the fiscal system and for more autonomy for CPF members to 
maximise returns (ibid 12). Hence, they argue that in order to accomplish its purpose 
of social security provision, the present CPF system needs to be remodelled to serve 
the CPF members rather than the government. However, there remain some flaws in 
the extensive work accomplished by Low and Aw as some crucial factors are 
overlooked in their historical analysis of the CPF. The historical analysis in this 
dissertation thus attempts to contribute by highlighting some of these critical elements 
(particularly in Chapter 2)which have been overlooked.  
 Hence, critical studies which examined welfare capitalism in East Asian have 
often overlooked the specific details and crucial social-historical developments in 
social security schemes; while detailed studies of specific social security schemes 
have been less than satisfactory in critically deconstructing the rationalities 
responsible for its emergence and evolution. 
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1.3 Theoretical Framework 
1.3.1 Social Control and Social Security  
“At one extreme, social control represents the oppression of a ruling class; at 
the other, social control is the connective tissue which binds together the 
perfectly functioning social organism.” (Dean 1991: 10) 
Studies on the CPF have so far neglected to examine thoroughly the element of 
social control which is required for such an extensive and intrusive social security 
mechanism. While the term social control is often associated with studies of 
criminology and deviant behaviors, a small group of scholars have sought to use this 
concept to examine the issue of social security provisions. One of the earliest of such 
works was the seminal work of Piven and Cloward (1974) who examined the 
development of public welfare programs in the USA. They examined the cyclical 
nature of the evolution of public relief programs in US and argued that expansive 
relief social policies were intended to mitigate social unrest while restrictive ones 
were designed to reinforce work ethic. Hence, Piven and Cloward concluded that the 
primary function of welfare programs was to regulate labor. Dean (1991) expanded on 
this theme by empirically examining the social security reforms in the UK during the 
1980s. In his insightful analysis, he argues that poverty and social security “go 
together like a horse and carriage” (ibid 8) with social control as the concept that links 
the two together, akin to the more established relationship between criminality and 
penal policy. Dean highlights that the concept of social control includes not just the 
“suppression of civil disorder and the enforcement of work norms, but also the 
imposition of individual self-discipline and „extra goodness‟” (ibid 2). He hence 
describes the history of the British social security system as a history of emerging 
disciplinary techniques. From a Marxist perspective, Gough (1979) argues that the 
welfare state emerges to legitimize the exploitative production systems at advanced 
stages of capitalism. The welfare state according to Gough is a contradictory 
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phenomenon which “embodies tendencies to enhance welfare, to develop the powers 
of individuals, to exert social control over the blind play of market forces; and 
tendencies to repress and control people, to adapt them to the requirements of the 
capitalist economy.” (ibid 12)  
1.3.2 Three Aspects of Social Control Embodied in the CPF 
However, for the case of Singapore, the State has consistently treated „welfare‟ 
as a bad word. The uniqueness as compared to the above analysis is hence not how 
social welfare is utilized as a form of social control, but rather how social control is 
utilized to avert the need for public welfare provision. The key defining characteristic 
of social security provisions in Singapore is hence its relentless emphasis on 
individual responsibility through both regulatory and ideological mechanisms, and the 
collective mobilization of collective/CPF savings to pursue governmentally defined 
productive goals. Hence, three interrelated aspects of social control with regards to the 
CPF and personal finance will be consistently explored throughout the chapters in this 
dissertation. 
A. Direct and Overtly Coercive Bureaucratic Aspect 
Firstly, the State establishes direct control over a portion of individuals‟ income, 
coercively directing it towards a centrally state-managed fund administered by the 
CPF Board. The conditions and requirements of the CPF system, such as contribution 
rates, withdrawal age and withdrawal conditions are determined by the State through 
legislative actions in the parliament and operationally implemented through 
bureaucratic enforcement by the CPF Board. Non-compliance with the CPF scheme is 
dealt with by systematic bureaucratic machinery which through surveillance and 
enforcement activities, seek to sanction the appropriate warnings and punishments. 
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This paternalistic emphasis on directly controlling a portion of individual‟s finances 
and concurrently ideologically emphasizing on „individual responsibility‟ is precisely 
because the government is wary of the general population‟s ability to manage their 
own finances.  
 As Max Weber (1949 and 1978) famously noted, one of the constitutive 
distinctiveness of capitalism was the emergence of the state holding a monopoly of 
legitimate physical violence, or in most cases the legitimacy to enforce legal 
sanctions. Central to this understanding is the rise of the bureaucracy, or the shift from 
„traditional‟ and „charismatic‟ bases of authority to a „rational-legal‟ basis of 
legitimization. According to Weber, traditional societies are governed by customs and 
conventions where power is passed down by lineage based on tribal, religious or 
cultural factors, while „charismatic‟ authority is based on an intrinsic and often 
spectacular quality of an individual leader. However, „legal-rational‟ authority which 
is the predominant form of authority practiced in contemporary advanced capitalistic 
societies is based not on individual or tribal/cultural characteristics, but rather by the 
formulation and propagation of a web of legal rulings. A legitimate „legal-rational‟ 
state thus possesses the necessary capacity for the imposition of coercive regulations 
through its bureaucratic machineries which regulate certain aspects of individuals‟ 
behavior so as to achieve a desired semblance of social order and regularity. The 
coercive and intrusive nature of the CPF system is hence muted by the societal 
acceptance in the greater good of the complex web of legal rulings. The state may 
thus be conceptualized as an assemblage of bureaucratic apparatuses having a 
combination of repressive and ideological functions (Althusser 1971), and this leads 





B. Ideological and Self-Disciplinary Aspect 
Secondly, as Dean (1994: 177) notes, the forms of power constituting the 
practices of governing comes to operate towards the directing of the conduct of the 
governed individual, rather than a “violent or gross form of corporeal domination”. 
Such a practice thus necessarily involves the promotion of a dominating ideology 
which seeks to establish social control efficiently and silently by directing individuals 
towards internalizing the desired rationalities required for self-discipline. Following 
the work of Chua (1997: 128-129), the state of „ideological hegemony/consensus‟ has 
the following conditions. Firstly, as Chua aptly points out, there is no „ideological 
time zero‟ as the ideological system is not conceived by the dominant group as a 
coherent system at a particular point in time. Rather the ideological system is a 
„loosely organized complex conceptual system‟ which develops over time as the 
ruling elite deals with the problems that arise over time (ibid 128). This ideological 
system is hence not random, but conceptually guided by a few socially accepted stable 
core concepts (meritocracy and individual responsibility). Secondly, ideological 
hegemony/consensus denotes the condition where the system of ideas of the ruling 
group is generally accepted and reproduced by the governed as an accepted part of 
everyday life (ibid). The achievement of this condition greatly enhances the 
legitimacy of the ruling elites to govern. Policing with regards to the CPF system 
under a condition of hegemony/consensus, although an indication that hegemony is 
incomplete, is regarded as a reasonable and required to maintain the general welfare 
of society. Lastly, the hegemony/consensus is constantly at risk of being disrupted, 
and a rupture exposes the state of political domination and the multiple trajectories of 
governing rationalities which are possible.  
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The overarching ideological core concepts that operates within the Singaporean 
system is what Lian (2008: 35) notes as “the PAP ideology of self-help, individual 
responsibility, social discipline and the work ethic”; while the ideological apparatuses 
involved in constructing and reproducing the CPF system involves education, mass 
media, and in the last decade the private financial services industry. Hence, the State 
achieves its goals of financially disciplining its population not just by coercive 
measures, but by the effective construction and dissemination of a system of 
rationalities that influence the desires of individuals such that they govern their own 
financial behavior. The societal acceptance of these ideological core concepts allows 
the government to be legitimately absolved of the financial liability of welfare 
provisions. This dissertation attempts to uncover such ideological 
construction/modification processes at various junctures of history.   
C. Social Mobilizing and Productive Aspect 
Thirdly, within the context of Singapore, the social control of individuals‟ has a 
productive aspect through the collective mobilization of CPF funds for governmental 
goals of economic development. The „productivist‟ nature of welfare capitalism in 
East Asia has been highlighted by Holliday (2000) and Holliday and Wilding (2003) 
who argue that social policy is an extension of economic policy and is subordinated to 
economic goals.  
However in Singapore‟s context, apart from the conventional notion of social 
policy investing in areas such as education and healthcare which improves the 
economic productivity of its population; through modifications of withdrawal 
conditions, the CPF system has gone much further and has effectively been a key 
mechanism where collective savings have been collectively mobilized and channeled 
towards „jump-starting‟ the development of certain industries. This is particularly 
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evident when CPF savings were liberalized firstly for housing schemes in 1968 (HDB 
flats) and 1981 (private properties) which resulted not just in substantive 
improvements in housing conditions, but also a more than a decade long boom for the 
construction and property related industries; and secondly, when CPF savings were 
liberalized in progressive stages since 1986 for investment as part of the strategy to 
develop Singapore as a key financial hub in Asia.  
The Singaporean „social laboratory‟ (Lee 2007: 23) thus provides an example of 
an extreme case of productivism where social policy actively mobilizes collective 
resources for stimulating economic development, and where the nexus of social 
security arrangements and State management mechanisms provided the initial basis 
for its present sovereign wealth funds which are one of the largest worldwide. The 
large pool of foreign reserves managed by the State enables latitude in pursuing 
productive pursuits in the social and economic arenas without incurring foreign debt 
as theoretically investment returns can be drawn upon to finance such projects when 
circumstances necessitates. The benefits and drawbacks of such an extreme state of 
productivism will also be evaluated within this dissertation.  
1.4 Aims and Contributions 
 The aims of this dissertation can hence be summarized as 1) to uncover the 
social historical processes and rationalities that led to the formation and subsequent 
evolution of the CPF from initially being a retirement plan, to gradually expand to 
include housing, healthcare, education, and investments, this which current literature 
have generally taken this for granted; 2) to examine the coercive and ideological 
aspects of social control as manifested by the various developments within the CPF 
system that enabled it to be both fiscally sustainable and economically productive in 
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accordance to developmental goals. A key argument presented here is that it is not 
necessarily social welfare goals that have driven the developments in the CPF system, 
but more often economic and market development problems that have driven its 
evolution as a pool of capital collectively mobilized by the State to meet these 
challenges. 
 While the 1997/8 Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath had led some to 
question the efficacy and robustness of welfare capitalism in East Asia (Lee 2007) and 
the associated “East Asian Miracle” (World Bank 1993); the current global financial 
crisis is leading firstly to a crisis and reformulation of the American model of welfare 
capitalism especially with regards to housing and social security provisions, and 
secondly, a shift back towards a more positive consideration of the Asian model of 
welfare capitalism. In America, the combination of easy credit and unregulated 
speculation on properties, coupled with predatory subprime lending practices which 
primarily targeted lower uneducated classes with questionable credit histories for 
mortgages disparate with their incomes has led to the formation and bursting of the 
property bubble. The huge extent to which subprime consumers defaulted on 
mortgages and faced imminent foreclosures hence translated into a spectacular 
implosion in the credit/financial markets and a global economic recession which is 
continually being compared to the Great Depression. Concurrently, healthcare and 
social security reforms are being formulated in America in a bid to recover long term 
fiscal sustainability and to tackle the soaring government debt which presently stands 
at an astonishing $12.1 trillion and are financed by weekly treasury auctions (The US 
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In contrast, while the property market in Singapore did retreat from its peak, it 
is now well back on recovery and housing provisions have generally remained 
secured throughout this crisis. Singapore‟s CPF system remains financially sound due 
to its fully funded principle and the State‟s total official foreign reserves stands at an 
impressive US$173 billion as of June 2009
2
. Hence within this context, an analysis of 
the emergence and the subsequent dynamic evolution of Singapore‟s CPF system 
offers several insights on how a social security mechanism, particularly a fully funded 
provident fund system can be creatively mobilized for fiscally sustainable economic 
and social development through collective management and mobilization of enforced 
individual savings.  
“At one level of analysis, all social entities are "historical individuals" 
(Streeck & Yamamura 2001), defying generalization and requiring a thorough 
reconstruction of their evolution, as well as description of their peculiarities, 
in their own terms. Social policy or welfare regimes are no exception.” 
(Schmidt 2008: 309) 
 Although the CPF system is a critical component of social and economic policy 
that underpins many different areas such as housing, education, family, manpower 
and labour, it has more often than not been but a „side-note‟ within sociological 
analysis of welfare regimes and social policy. Hence, this dissertation contributes to 
existing literature by attempting a „thorough reconstruction‟ and systematic analysis 
of the emergence and evolution of the primary apparatus of social security provision 
                                                          
1
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aDugor_ds3W8   
“Treasuries Fall as Goldman Boosts Forecast, Record Sales Loom”, Accessed on 5th August 2009 
2
 http://www.mas.gov.sg/data_room/reserves_statistics/Official_Foreign_Reserves.html “Official 
Foreign Reserves”, Accessed on 6th August 2009.  
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in Singapore, the CPF, from a perspective that views it as a mechanism for the social 
control of individuals‟ finance for collective social and economic goals.  
Noting that the CPF emphasizes the fully self-funded principle based on an 
ethos of self-responsibility; while the explicit goal of the CPF is to provide for 
retirement, its success for the individual has primarily been in the provision of public 
housing. From the governmental point of view, what it accomplishes however is a 
creation of a disciplinary regime that internalizes within the individual citizen the 
responsibility of social security provisions, and at the same time serves as a valuable 
financial resource for the pursuit of productive economic goals.  
The following chapters are organized according to periodization based on 
significant shifts in ideological rationalities within the CPF system which translated 
into material changes in contribution rates, and/or the implementation of new 
schemes. Chapter 2 (1951-1967) examines the formative years of the CPF system 
noting the perilous circumstances in which it emerged from and the early coercive 
mechanisms of consolidation. Chapter 3 (1968-1976) explores the social-historical 
conditions and the economic rationalities that prompted the shift in emphasis from 
retirement to housing provision. Chapter 4 (1977-1985) explores the period where the 
CPF system was first functionally differentiated into various accounts, and its 
expansion both in terms of contribution rates and functionalities. The increase in 
contribution rates was for macroeconomic management purposes and to build up a 
national investment reserve, while the expansion in functionalities resulting was a 
response to anticipated demographical challenges of an ageing population. Chapter 5 
(1986-1998) examines the implications of the first economic recession experienced by 
Singapore since independence, and the State‟s reactions with regards to manipulating 
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the CPF system to stimulate the economy. Chapter 6 (1999-2009) examines the 
refocusing of the CPF system which resulted in a greater degree of control for the 
lower classes, and the expansion of social control of personal finance beyond the CPF 
system by utilizing the private financial sector as an intermediary of control which 
concurrently resulted in a stimulation of growth in the financial sector. Finally 
Chapter 7 would sum up the findings and limitations of this dissertation, and would 





Chapter 2: Emergence and Consolidation of the CPF 1951-
1967 
 
The genesis of thinking about social security and the social control of personal 
finance in Singapore began when in 1946, the newly formed Department of Social 
Welfare undertook the Social Survey of Singapore (Singapore 1947). An analysis of 
this survey showed that a majority of immigrants had not returned to their homeland 
since they arrived (ibid: 112-113) suggesting a pattern of permanent settlement. Since 
these migrants were predominantly single males with little personal savings, the 
Colonial Government hence faced a social problem of a growing permanent 
population with no social security provisions.  
This chapter hence examines the emergence of the CPF system and emphasizes 
the formation of a coercive bureaucratic mechanism which sought to enforce savings 
for retirement provisions from the population. The first section will examine the 
historical conditions in which the CPF emerged from particularly highlighting the 
CPF‟s emergence with the infamous Hock Lee Bus Riots and demonstrating that its 
emergence was not without opposition and contention. The second section will 
examine the consolidation of the CPF through the development of surveillance and 
enforcement techniques which sought to combat collusion and evasion by employers 
and employees. As such, this chapter examines the overtly coercive aspect of the 
social control of personal finance in its formative years. 
 
2.1 Emergence of the CPF (1951-1955): Pension Fund versus Provident Fund 
The primary consideration within this historical context was the colonial 
governmental dilemma between developing a pension fund pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
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scheme, compared with a fully funded, save-as-you-earn (SAYE) provident fund 
scheme for the population who were showing signs of settling in Singapore
3
.  
 A functionalistic analysis of the advantages of each system is provided by Low and 
Aw (1997: 8) and described below.  
 
PAYG pension fund system: 
1. No stock of funds needs to be managed as current revenue is actuarially 
projected to meet current obligations. 
2. A simpler and cheaper administration when the system is young. 
3. No inflationary risks that erode the value of retirement payouts.  
4. When productivity and real wages are high, high retirement benefits and low 
contributions are possible as long as old age dependency ratio is low.  
SAYE provident fund system: 
1. No actuarial projections are required as each generation/individual supports 
itself through individual saving accounts.  
2. High benefits and low contributions are possible when the passivity ratio 
(retirement to working years) is low and interest rate is high. 
3. A potential stock of funds that the government can access for fiscal or 
monetary purposes if the scheme is compulsory and state managed.  
4. A fully-funded system encourages national savings as compared to a PAYG 
system which may reduce incentive to save.  
 
A critical approach would, however, elucidate another side. Firstly, due to the 
absence of inter-class and inter-generational transfers, a SAYE provident fund 
                                                          
3
 Generally, a PAYG scheme places a social security tax on the current working population which is 
used to support pension payouts for current retirees; while a SAYE scheme forces the current working 
population to contribute to an individual savings account which they rely on upon retirement. 
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reproduces social structures and its resulting social inequalities. Advocates however, 
argue for its equitable basis and that the PAYG pension fund impairs work ethic. 
Secondly, the provident fund approach potentially allows for a double exploitation of 
waged workers. Apart from the surplus value that is exploited from labor; by 
withholding a portion of worker‟s income for years in the name of retirement 
provision, the state is essentially able to borrow cheaply at an artificially and 
arbitrarily imposed rate from the working population to pursue governmental goals in 
an apparently legitimate fashion. Surplus value can thus again be raked off from the 
working population‟s enforced savings if the resulting benefits are not equitably 
redistributed. Finally, in an authoritarian regime where the state administers an 
individual‟s provident fund account, the scheme can be manipulated into a system of 
psychological threat against any possible political dissent or labor militancy by the 
threat of „freezing‟ individuals‟ accounts. However, it must be noted that in 
Singapore‟s case, as the following chapters will show, this paternalistic control of 
social savings was eventually mobilized for economically and socially productive 
purposes of housing and later on, financial investments.   
In 1951, a CPF Bill proposing a provident fund approach was introduced in the 
Legislative Council and sent to a Colony Select Committee for investigation. 
Concurrently, a commission was established to investigate the various methods of 
ensuring retirement benefits (McFadzean Report, Singapore 1952). This report 
recommended a PAYG pension scheme as it was estimated that there would be 
inadequate retirement payouts for a provident fund scheme until 1970 due to older 
workers having insufficient years to accumulate adequate savings (ibid: 14-15). In 
addition, a member of the commission, H.K Rogers, held the view that that familial 
and friendship ties were sufficient to meeting the retirement needs where personal 
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savings proved inadequate, and highlighted the potential societal resistance towards 
governmental schemes which coercively register waged workers to establish a 
mechanism for the social control of an individual‟s finances (ibid 16-17).  
Despite these recommendations, in October 1953, the Colonial Government 
opted for a SAYE, fully self-funded provident fund scheme and on 11 December 
1953, the CPF Ordinance was enacted (CPF 2000: 7). No official study conclusively 
underpinned this decision to adopt such a policy stance and there were no attempts to 
prove that a provident fund scheme was more beneficial for the population. Situated 
within the historical context of burgeoning anti-imperialist and nationalist 
movements, the provident fund was chosen over the pension scheme due to its self-
funding principle, and the British simply made a political-economical decision not to 
implicate themselves with any financial burden (Low and Aw 1997: 19-20). With the 
necessary legislative bills in place, the CPF was originally scheduled to be launched 
on 1
st
 May 1955, enforcing an equal contribution of 5 per cent each by both 
employees and employers for a total contribution of 10 per cent, and a maximum 
contribution of $50 per month. 
Resistance to the idea of a compulsory provident fund arose from both 
employers and employees. For employers this meant a compulsory increase in labor 
costs. For the majority of the working class who barely earned enough to support their 
households, this meant a stretching of finances for retirement benefits which appeared 
distant as compared to their immediate pressing basic needs. To make matters worse, 
even when many workers voiced their discontent about the idea of compulsory 
savings which they could not withdraw in times of emergencies, R.K. Malcolm the 
first General Manager of the CPF, replied by saying, “The question of unemployment 
and sickness benefits is important and is one which the Government will no doubt 
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look into, but it is not related to the purpose of the Fund.” (CPF 2005: 21) It appeared 
that the state was bent on implementing a scheme for enforced retirement savings to 
absolve itself of future financial liability. For the majority of the population who faced 
economic uncertainties of unemployment and the everyday reality of diseases due to 
poor housing and sanitary conditions, the inflexible nature of the CPF made no sense. 
Coupled with the coercive and uninvited intrusion into the area of personal finance 
which represents to a great degree the only sphere of life in capitalism where waged 
laborers could exercise some form of agency and choice, the conditions for violent 
resistance of the masses was fueled. 
 
Implication of CPF with the Hock Lee Bus Riots 
While the Hock Lee Bus Riots of 1955
4
 is usually associated with protests 
against economic exploitation of workers, unequal education policies, and the 
subsequent latching on of communists‟ interest upon such issues; it has not been 
examined with relation to the CPF. I am not making any claims of causation that the 
implementation of the CPF scheme caused the riots; but rather, a more modest 
assertion that the proposed CPF scheme provided additional fuel to the discontent 
already present among the lower working class is advanced. This is implied in several 
instances as examined below.  
Firstly, the following exchange between Lim Ching Siong (Member for Bukit 
Timah and the leader of the influential Factory and Shop Workers‟ Union and Middle 
Road Group of Unions which participated in the riots), and Lim Yew Hock (Minister 
for Labor and Welfare) from the Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates (SLAD) 
                                                          
4
The Hock Lee Bus Riots of 1955 was one of the worst industrial riots in Singapore‟s history. Mass 
riots involving crowds estimated at 2000 students and 300-400 strikers attacked the police with bottles 
and stones. The police responded mainly with tear-gas, but firearms were also used. By dawn, 4 people 
were killed and another 31 injured. For a detailed account of the Hock Lee Bus Riots, see Clutterbuck 
1984: 108-110 and Drysdale 1984: 106-109. 
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dated 27 April 1955, a day before the police were called in to disperse the strike and 
just 4 days before the official implementation of the CPF is as follows: 
“I hope that the Government is aware of the widespread 
dissatisfaction among workers against this [CPF] Ordinance. The 
wages of the workers today are already too low to meet the basic 
human needs of the workers and their families. The bitter struggle for 
existence will become harder for the majority of workers if they are 
forced to contribute 5 percent of their low wages. The Government 
does not seem to be interested in the present insecurity of the workers. 
Strangely enough, the Government pretends to be interested in the 
future security of the workers, but not their present security..... First, 





“The Member of Bukit Timah touched on the Central Provident Fund. 
I am happy to learn that he is now in agreement that there should be 
amendments to this Ordinance. Reports in the newspapers lately 
showed that the People‟s Action Party was organizing unions into 
opposing this Central Provident Fund, and when it was pointed out 
that by opposing it, instead of trying to amend it, was just playing into 






It is not a far stretch of imagination to hypothesize that Lim Ching Siong‟s 
discourse concerning the government‟s disinterest in workers‟ present security would 
have been repeatedly and forcefully articulated at union meetings, student group 
meetings and industrial strikes to stir up discontentment. Following this, despite the 
admission that by the end of March 1955 the registration was completed, that special 
accounting machinery had arrived in Singapore, and that an official gazette was 
published on 4
th





 April, 1955, a day after the first signs of serious social unrest, and a day after 
the above exchange, Lim Yew Hock unilaterally announced, without the consent of 
                                                          
5
Singapore Legislative Assembly, Debates Official Reports (SLAD). Vol. 1, No. 3, 27 April 1955, Col 
113 
6
SLAD.  Vol. 1, No. 3, 27 April 1955, Col 135 
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the Legislative Assembly, that the implementation of the CPF would be postponed 
and matters remained in abeyance
7
.  
Secondly, in the aftermath of the riots, on 29
 
June 1955, a hastily but politically 
ingenious amendment was drafted. 
“…… an amending Bill was formulated and passed through all stages 
of the Legislative Assembly under a Certificate of Urgency issued by 
the Officer Administering the Government. Tabled by Labor Minister 
Lim Yew Hock, the amending Bill exempted workers earning less than 
$200 from contributing to the Fund although their employers still had 
to pay their share. Those who earned between $200 and $210 would 
contribute only an amount that would not reduce their take-home pay 
to below $200.” (CPF 2005: 22-23) 
 
The arbitrarily defined $200 can be understood as an extremely “generous” 
safety measure considering that the 1953-1954 social survey found the mean 
household income to be only $168 a month (Goh 1956: 112), and the Report of the 
Committee of Minimum Standards of Livelihood (Caine Report, Singapore 1957a) 
found that the average wage of workers in regular employment was about $150 a 
month, but the “commonest wage is between $100-$120 a month” (ibid 61). More 




The implication of the amendment was exceptionally psychologically 
satisfactory to the working class as it effectively translated into an enforced 5 percent 
pay rise without any reduction in take-home pay. The last minute bill amendment was 
thus designed to subvert any potential problematic discourses which the leftist trade 
unions‟ could exploit; this which worked to transform the CPF from being a source of 
discontent into an instrument for additional welfare. Concurrently, another clause was 
                                                          
7
 Singapore, CPF, Chairman‟s Statement and Accounts of the Fund for the Year Ended 31st December 
1955.  
SLAD. Vol. 1, No. 6, 29 June 1955, Col 349 
8
 SLAD. Vol. 27,1 August 1968, Col 791 
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inserted which consolidated the social control of personal finance in the hands of the 
state by ruling that “private provident funds or schemes will not be eligible for 
approval for exemption from CPF unless they were established before 11
th
 December 
1953, the date of the enactment of the Ordinance.”9 With these rushed amendments 
passed, the CPF came into implementation on the 1 July 1955, and the state had a foot 
in the door for the social control of an individual‟s personal finance.  
 
2.2 Consolidation and Enforcement by the State: Evasion and Collusion by 
Employers and Employees (1955 to 1967) 
 
For the next 13 years, CPF contribution rates were unchanged and no major 
schemes was introduced. Hence, in official accounts, this period is often a period of 
silence. Academic accounts have also followed in taking for granted the apparent 
inactivity during this period. This section thus attempts to uncover the historical 
significance of this period and to problematize the present consensus by historically 
excavating the processes of enforcement, surveillance and political maneuvering 
which constructed the success of the present institution. This phase was a period 
where the state consolidated its decision for a provident fund, and where the 
techniques of enforcement and its bureaucratic disciplinary apparatus were 
experimentally developed to combat collusion and evasion by employers and 
employees. 
In 1957, the Caine Committee (Singapore 1957a) concluded that the CPF 
scheme would not be sufficient to fully meet retirement provision needs and 
recommended that instead of a provident fund, a comprehensive social security 
scheme based on “the principle of pooling, as in insurance,” (ibid 63) be 
implemented. Despite these recommendations and similar ones advocated by 
                                                          
9
 SLAD. Vol. 1, No. 6, 29 June 1955, Col 346 
 28 
 
International Labor Organization Specialist, Brocklehurst (Singapore 1957b), the 
newly elected Labor Front Government
10
 persisted in the CPF and minor amendments 
were made to the CPF Ordinance to further consolidate its power. In 1 June 1957, the 
window after which CPF contributions are liable was shorten from the original three 
months to one month, and the penalty to be charged on late contributions was 
increased to 1 percent per month, subjected to a minimum charge of $1
11
. 
Concurrently, efforts were taken to develop a systematic bureaucracy for 
enforcing CPF contributions. Hence the Enforcement Division was formally 
established with a steadily increasing number of enforcement inspectors. Between 
1955 and 1956, it was estimated that two-thirds of the increase of the 50,000 CPF 
accounts was attributed to the “vigorous action taken to enforce compliance”12. 
Collusion between employers and employees to evade contributions or to contribute 
less than stipulated rates was frequently observed, especially among odd job laborers 
and their employers. Employers exploited a legal loophole by contending that because 
their workmen were piece-rated and not on a „contract of service‟; they were not 
obliged to pay contributions for them. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the System of Contract Labor in Singapore (1960) highlighted that “in a large number 
of cases the Central Provident Fund Ordinance was complied with neither in the letter 
nor the spirit.” (ibid 91), and in some cases, the turnover of labor was intentionally 
kept within the 24-26 day period so that the employer would not be liable for CPF 
contributions. (ibid 9) 
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 In a form of limited internal self-government, local representatives who were elected in the 1955 
elections gained control over commerce, industry, labor, immigration, social welfare education, 
housing, communications, public works and health. The British remained in control of the crucial 
ministries of defense, internal security and foreign affairs, and possessed veto power over legislation.  
11
 Singapore, CPF, Chairman‟s Statement and Accounts of the Fund for the Year Ended 31st December 
1957.  
12





Many cases of underpayment of contributions occur either intentionally or 
unintentionally by an under-declaration of wages paid and received. The exact extent 
of collusion to evade CPF contributions is difficult to determine; but it must have 
been sufficiently widespread enough to warrant the following warning: 
“Employers who enter into agreements to evade the law are unwise, 
because in addition to any fine imposed by the Court an employer who 
fails to pay contributions for his employees at the proper rate and at 
the proper time becomes liable to pay considerable interest charges 
and loses the right to recover from his employees the amount of 
contributions he would otherwise be entitled to deduct from their 
wages”13 
 
To rectify this, the Commission proposed that the one-month clause before CPF 
contributions are liable be deleted such that employers who employ casual labor 
would be liable to CPF contributions. However, technical difficulties in accounting 
mechanisms prevented the immediate implementation of this until a new electronic 
computer system using individual punched cards for each employee was acquired at 
the end of 1962
14
. Investments towards technology thus enabled the establishment of 
a structure of coercion through which the effective accounting and surveillance was 
carried out, this which allowed the CPF to be extended to a greater portion of 
population than was previously possible. 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Enforcement Proceedings from 1955-1967 
 
- Denotes that there is no available data 
*Denotes the number of employers who were formally warned    
Sources: Singapore, CPF, Chairman‟s Statement and Accounts of the Fund, various years. 
 
With a new “computerized” system in place, an Amendment Bill was passed on 
20 December 1963
15
 which shrewdly incorporated the carrot and stick approach. The 
carrot being that with immediate effect, the interest rate paid towards CPF 
contributions was doubled from 2.5 percent to 5.0 percent for the year ended 31
st
 
December 1963 with the intention of persuading the population that CPF 
contributions would be towards their benefit. On the other hand, the one-month clause 
before CPF contributions become liable was removed, and regulations were made to 
extend the CPF Ordinance to cover odd job laborers. Significantly, inspectors were 
legally empowered to summon an employer for examination with matters regarding 
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1955 12,900 180,000 - - - - 
1956 19,000 210,000 (230,00) - - - - 
1957 19,400 215,000 (265,000) - - - - 
1958 19,650 216,000 (284,000) 10,000 - 57 0.51 
1959 19,500 210,000 (304,000) 17,000 - 73 0.87 
1960 20,300 216,000  (321,000) 17,000 1,000* 84 0.84 
1961 20,900 224,000 (338,000) 19,600 1,800* 207 0.94 
1962 20,400 213,000 (352,000) 15,704 - 153 0.77 
1963 21,050 253,547 (369,868) 22,000 1,700* 132 1.05 
1964 27,049 264,222 (393,743) 20,000 10,000 45 0.74 
1965 28,164 273,690 (417,594) 25,000 11,000 36 0.89 
1966 29,941 290,194 (442,351) - - - - 
1967 30,000 299,157 (465,029) - - - - 
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the CPF, where previously the power was limited to examining only the employee.
16
 
Thus, legal loopholes which technically allowed for evasion and collusion were 
closed down and casual workers were brought into the scope of the CPF. 
In another astute political move, prominent leaders of the then vastly popular 
leftist trade unions were briefly co-opted into enforcing CPF contributions with a 
focus on ensuring that employers contribute their required 5 percent (especially for 
workers earning less than $200 per month) as a form of working class welfare. J. J 
Puthucheary was appointed the Chairman of the CPF Board from 1959 to 1961, and 
Fong Swee Suan 
17
was involved in the above mentioned Commission of Inquiry 
which sought to extend the benefits of the CPF scheme to the contract laborer system 
which covered a large number of workers at that time. 
Beginning in 1957, the decision was made to criminally prosecute persistent 
non-compliant employers as, “considerable effort has been directed towards obtaining 
compliance with the Ordinance from small employers without resorting to extreme 
measures, but it has become apparent that in future, increasing use will have to be 
made of legal proceedings to punish offenders.”18 Between 1958 and 1965, a total of 
146,304 visits, or 0.82 visits per employer in a year were made by enforcement 
inspectors to places of employment; 4,500 employers received formal warnings; and a 
total of 787 employers were criminally charged for willful evasion in this period. 
Despite these actions, evasion and collusion probably persisted to a significant degree 
as is demonstrated by the large number of criminal prosecution cases from 1970-
1987. Many of these cases would have gone undetected for several years before the 
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 SLAD. Vol. 21,  24 July 1963, Col 55-60 
17
 J.J Puthucheary was a paid secretary of the Factory and Shop Worker‟s Union, the largest trade union 
at that point of time. Fong Swee Suan was the General Secretary of the Singapore Bus Workers‟ Union 
and together with Lim Chin Siong was in control of the largest, most organized, energetic and militant 
union – the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students‟ Union. (Drysdale 1984: 125) 
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sophistication and scope of enforcement eventually caught. As compared to the next 2 
decades where enforcement activity significantly increased, this was the experimental 
beginnings of a bureaucracy which through increasingly technologically sophisticated 
means sought to systematically enforce the CPF Ordinance. 
In summary, this chapter has sought to complement the gaps in existing 
literature on the CPF by highlighting the resistance to the implementation of the CPF 
as epitomized by its implications with the Hock Lee Bus Riots and the development 
of enforcement technologies in response to evasion and collusion; these which 
demonstrate the overtly coercive nature of the social control of personal finance as 
embodied by the CPF system.   
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Chapter 3: From Retirement Savings to Housing 
Spending 1968-1976 
 
1968 was the pivotal year where an abrupt shift occurred in the fundamental 
purpose of the CPF. The decision to extend the CPF from retirement provision to 
include housing provisions was a significant policy reversal as less than a year ago, 
repeated appeals for the withdrawal of CPF funds for housing were flatly rejected. 
The year 1968 thus marks firstly, a shift in the fundamental goal of the CPF, and 
secondly, the beginning of a significant expansion of the intrusion of social control 
into the realm of personal finance. The coercive techniques of forced resettlements 
and land acquisitions; persuasive technologies of modern mass high-rise public 
housing and sophisticated urban planning; coupled with the legally binding assurance 
that increased CPF contributions could be used to purchase houses, allowed the 
gradual and steady increase in the social control of personal finance. From 1968 to 
1974, in the short span of 7 years, total CPF contribution rates tripled from 10 to 30 
percent, eventually hitting a peak rate of 50 percent during 1984-1985.  
With the liberalization of CPF savings for housing purchases, the steady 
increase of CPF contribution rates was accepted as a rationalized exchange. By 
allowing CPF withdrawals for the purchase of HDB flats, the CPF essentially began 
the process of transformation from an „enforced savings scheme‟ to a narrowly state-
defined „encouraged spending scheme‟. Concurrently, privately managed pension 
funds were slowly phased out and their members switched into the CPF scheme as 
they could not cope with the increase rates
19
. At the end of 1969, only 8 private funds 
continued functioning as approved funds with a total membership of only 470 as 
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compared with 330,993 active CPF accounts
20
. It would never have been possible for 
private pension funds to keep pace with the CPF contribution rates as private funds 
were not authorized to be utilized for the housing expenditures, and the social control 
of personal finance was consolidated within the hands the State.  
The first section of this chapter examines the question of why such a shift 
occurred within its particular social-historical setting, paying particular attention to 
the productive economic rationalities involved. The second section then examines 
how such a shift proceeded in reality in relation to coercive and ideological processes 
involved. 
 
3.1 Why did such a Shift occur in 1968? Socio-political vs. Economic Reasons 
 
Low and Aw (1997: 39 and 2004: 91) have argued that this expansion of the 
CPF social security scheme to incorporate housing was “more a socio-political 
decision than an economic one” as housing was the “natural medium to raise political 
commitment and stakeholdership”. Housing provided the socio-political cement to 
complement and supplement the economic policy of export-oriented industrialization 
(EOI), and the latch-on to social security was the epitome of PAP‟s socio-political 
commitment towards 100 percent home ownership in the “spirit of socialism and 
egalitarianism” (Teh 1984: 89). Similarly, Chua (1997: 10) has convincingly 
highlighted the “political credit that has accrued from the successful public-housing 
programme”.  
I do not dispute that home ownership engenders stakeholdership and that a 
successful housing policy contributes substantially to political legitimacy of the PAP; 
however, my contention is that it was not a socio-political decision, but an economic 
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necessity that initiated the inclusion of housing into the CPF framework within the 
particular historical juncture. It was an accidental discovery of how to make housing 
policy work, and the social-political benefits that arose were aftereffects which 
reinforced this shift and kept housing as a priority within CPF even till today.  
Socio-political rationalities for promoting permanent home ownership among 
the immigrant population existed especially after August 1965 on the unexpected 
independence of Singapore. But, as late as in October 1967, an unnamed “HDB 
officer” (CPF 1995: 8), had a proposal for CPF savings to be used in repaying 
installments on HDB flats rejected. A month later, a request similar in concept was 
made by a member of parliament to “promote homeownership among the lower 
income groups” 21 . This too was flatly rejected by the Labor Minister who 
acknowledged that the suggestion had already been given due consideration, but that 
statistics revealing that 74 percent of CPF members had balances of less than $1,000, 
and that 58 percent had less than $500, prove that this would be futile due to the “low 
balances held by the great majority of the members of the Fund.”22 Clearly, socio-
political reasons are inadequate in explaining the location within this particular 
historical juncture, the radical departure from its earlier discursive positions.  
 
3.1.1 Productive Economic Rationalities 
It was however economic exigencies that caused the abrupt expansion of the 
CPF to include housing provisions. Less than a month after the above mentioned 
proposals were thrown out, on 18
th
 November 1967, the British pound sterling was 
devalued by 14.3%
23
 and the British government was pressured to cut back on 
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 This request was to allow CPF savings as down payments rather instalments for the purchase of 
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spending due to the associated economic problems. Suddenly, on 16
th
 January 1968, 
the British government unilaterally decided to accelerate the withdrawal such that by 
March 1971, the Singapore bases would be completely evacuated within 3 years 
(Turnbull 1977: 304-305 and Drysdale 1984: 400-401).  
This caused a serious threat to the Singapore economy and unemployment 
threatened to spiral out of control. On top of the 25,000 new jobs a year for school 
leavers, it was estimated by Goh Keng Swee that 18,000 additional jobs a year would 
have to be created to absorb the effects of the employment vacuum caused by British 
military withdrawal. In spite of the remarkable efforts at rapid industrialization, from 
1963 to 1967, only 5,000 new jobs were created in new industries (Drysdale 1984: 
400-401). Britain‟s spending in Singapore totaled $450 million a year, and accounted 
for about 25 percent of Singapore‟s gross national product. In total, British military 
bases employed about 25,000 local people, of whom 21,000 were Singapore citizens 
(Turnbull 1977: 305). In addition, the presence of expatriates provided employment 
for thousands of others involved in services such as retail, catering and entertainment. 
British military presence was a vital factor contributing to economic growth in the 




Noting the precarious economic situation in Singapore, the HDB was mobilized 
as to temporarily soak up a significant portion of the expected unemployment to 
ensure social stability. 
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 37 
 
“This decision [British military withdrawal] has serious repercussions on the 
economy of Singapore, particularly in aggravating our unemployment 
problems. The Housing & Development Board as the major construction 
authority, whose activities over the past 8 years had provided employment for 
tens of thousands of people, must be called upon to play its part in the ensuing 
years in order to cushion off the effects of the accelerated British withdrawal. 
With the increased pressure for more jobs to be created……the Government 
will strive to provide more public housing, the construction of which will 
create jobs to absorb some of the 30,000 people who will lose their 
employment as a result of the British withdrawal and a further 25,000 youths 
who will each year be looking for jobs for the first time.”  (The HDB Annual 
Report 1967: 18) 
 
An expansionary fiscal policy built upon expanding public housing was possible 
on the supply side since CPF reserves were mandated in 1968 to be invested in 
government securities rather than UK sterling assets due to the devaluation. This 
effectively turned the CPF into being the financier of the HDB supplying it with the 
necessary funds for deficit financing (Low and Aw 2004: 88).  
However, it would be of little sustainable economic benefit if the HDB flats that 
were built were not quickly sold off. The solution by the PAP government was an 
innovative one. It involved altering the CPF system so as to socially engineer a 
situation where CPF members would be encouraged to participate in the Home 
Ownership Scheme by firstly, allowing CPF savings and contributions to be used for 
purchasing HDB flats, and secondly, by increasing the CPF contribution rates steadily 
so that low balances would not hinder the purchase of public housing. In effect, the 
CPF bypassed the conventional banking system and constituted what Chua (1997: 23) 
described as a “closed circuit of monetary transfer within the public-housing sector” 
with favorable terms of interests for all parties. 
 
Reacting swiftly, in April 1968, then PM Lee Kuan Yew made a key policy 
reversal and revealed that the government was studying ways to see how CPF savings 
could be used in the purchase of HDB flats (CPF 1995: 8). This marked a sudden and 
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abrupt shift in the discursive practices of constructing CPF savings as long term 
retirement provisions, to include short term provisions for housing expenditure. A 
month later, in a memorandum presented in parliament, the strategy of utilizing 
domestic savings in the form of CPF funds to initiate an expansionary fiscal policy to 
counter economic recession and unemployment was formalized as quoted below. 
“It is necessary to mobilize domestic savings to be employed in our 
counter recession strategy. Under consideration are selected 
increases in the rates of Central Provident Fund contributions…… 
Concurrently a scheme is being worked out between the Ministry and 
the Housing and Development Board to enable balances in the 
present Central Provident Fund to be set off against the first 
installment of Housing Board flats.”25 
 
Following up speedily the appropriate legislative amendments was passed on 1 
August 1968 and came into effect a month later. This CPF (Amendment) Bill which 
released the CPF savings of members for purchase of HDB flats and increased the 
CPF contribution rates, was “designed to meet the challenging economic problems 
that loom ahead,” by “the marshalling of domestic savings for the economic and 
social benefit of our people”26 to ensure that there would be an adequate demand for 
public housing so as to complete the circle of economic stimulus. The primary 
objective was a swift stimulus plan for countering economic recession, and to create 
employment opportunities to soak up the rising tide of unemployed. Indeed, it was 
estimated that the most beneficial effect from the HDB‟s massive public housing 
program was that it generated employment estimated at 15,000 jobs directly or 
indirectly, for every 10,000 units constructed per annum (Teh 1975: 19).  
 
This policy shift was a huge success as the PAP succeeded in shaping the 
conduct of the population to complement the wider governmental goal of economic 
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development. On the demand side, in 1968 alone, 7,407 applications were made to 
purchase flats under the revised Home Ownership Scheme, more applications than for 
the past 4 years. From 1968 to 1971, applications to purchase flats skyrocketed to 
56,358, while the applications made to rent HDB flat fell to 43,801; from 1972 to 
1975, the trend towards purchase instead of rental became even more pronounced, 
with 102,908 applications for purchase compared with 46,363 applications for rental. 
The measures were so successful in changing the conduct of the general population 
that by 1971, the waiting period for the allocation of HDB flats was “at least one and 
a half to two years, sometimes even longer.”27 On the supply side, between 1968 and 
1971, an average of 14,400 units was constructed, and the year after British military 
withdrawal was completed, 20,252 units were completed. As a result of this massive 
building campaign, the construction sector grew by an average of 23 percent per 
annum so that its contribution to GDP increased from 2.0 percent in 1960 to 6.8 
percent in 1973 (ibid 19). Industries which supplied construction materials such as 
steel factories producing reinforced steel bars and steel wire mesh, cement factories, 
granite quarries, brick kilns, paint manufacturing, and ironmongeries benefited 
tremendously. Hence, with some creative policy-making, the CPF financially satisfied 
both the supply and demand requirements of the HDB, and played an economically 
productive role of mitigating unemployment and promoting socio-political stability.  
 
3.2 How did such a Shift Proceed in Reality?  
How was it possible to gain compliance for an increasing degree of State control 
of personal finance through rising CPF contribution rates? In relation to this, how was 
the state able to permanently alter the financial habits of individuals such that 
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expenditure on permanent public housing became an enduring feature? In actuality, 
due to the various governmental measures, and the technologies of power imbued 
with “aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired 
effects and averting certain undesired ones” (Rose, 1999:52); the CPF system began 
to be transformed from being „enforced savings‟ to „encouraged spending‟ within a 
narrow framework of State approved expenditure items with public housing purchase 
as the primary component. I shall seek to uncover the coercive and ideological 
processes in this shift by examining 1) the restriction of housing options from private 
housing to public flats; 2) the changing of housing expenditure patterns from renting 
to purchasing and; 3) the evolution of the technologies of enforcement and 
surveillance.  
 




3.2.1 Restricting the Housing Options: From Private Housing to Public HDB Flats 
Table 3.1: HDB Housing and Resettlement Statistics  
 Housing Supply and Demand Key Resettlement Statistics 











Cases Rehoused in 
HDB 
accommodation 
1960 1,682 2,627 - 384 45 
1961 7,320 3,381 - 294 77 
1962 12,230 13,177 - 817 342 
1963 10,085 11,895 - 1,181 589 
1964 13,028 9,928 1,451 3,643 2,584 
1965 10,085 11,400 1,516 6,510 4,570 
1966 12,659 17,313 1,576 6,018 4,158 
1967 12,098 15,562 2,384 5,984 4,002 
1968 14,135 9,501 7,407 5,863 4,063 
1969 13,096 11,305 8,048 6,519 3,924 
1970 14,251 12,324 20,598 6,125 3,922 
1971 16,147 10,671 20,305 3,882 2,263 
1972 20,252 11,888 24,644 4,060 2,668 
1973 23,224 13,685 45,999 12,067 8,008 
1974 26,169 10,480 16,588 10,980 7,062 
1975 28,027 10,310 15,677 12,011 7,447 
1976 30,024 9,209 16,498 11,015 6,052 
1977 30,406 9,704 21,870 15,018 8,137 
Sources: Singapore, Housing and Development Board, The HDB Annual Report, various years. 
 
Through forced resettlements and land acquisitions for urban and industrial 
development, the State began a process that concentrated housing options for majority 
of its population within the HDB. Under the Housing and Development Board 
Ordinance (1959), the HDB was charged with the responsibilities of “providing and 
executing the proposals, plans, and projects for housing, slum clearance, urban 
redevelopment, and resettlement” (Yeung 1973: 34-35). Combined with the 
unrestricted power vested by the Land Acquisition Act (1966) which empowered the 
State to acquire land “for any residential, commercial or industrial purposes” (ibid 
38), the State was able to increase its ownership of land from 26.1 percent of 
Singapore‟s land area in 1968, to 67 percent in 1980, and to 75 percent in 1985 (Linda 
Lim 1989: 185, Wong and Ooi 1989: 791). While these legislations may have been 
enacted to control land prices and facilitate the rapid development of industrial zones, 
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housing estates and infrastructure; their application had the effect of ensuring that the 
working class had no access to cheap freehold land and no prospect of returning to a 
semi-rural subsistence lifestyle (Tremewan 1996: 53). From 1968 to 1976, 
resettlement cases due to land clearances‟ that were subsequently rehoused in HDB 
flats amounted to a substantial 45,409 units of HDB flats. This accounted for a 
significant 24.5 percent of the occupancy of 185,325 units of HDB flats constructed 
within this timeframe, and the impact of land acquisitions and clearances was that it 
began the process of the physical destruction of all alternative forms of cheap 
housing. This resulted in low cost public housing as the only viable option for the 
majority of the population. 
Ideological strategies were concurrently undertaken to propagate and legitimize 
the rationality of urban redevelopment and the acceptability of high rise and high 
density living conditions which were unnatural to majority of the population 
accustomed to living in attap and zinc roofed houses or shop houses. For example, an 
attractive booklet entitled “Bukit Ho Swee Estate” which described the 1961 fire in 
Bukit Ho Swee, one of the worst slums in Singapore, and its subsequent 
transformation by the HDB into a modern self-contained housing estate, was 
distributed by the HDB. Additionally, the HDB conducted a series of weekend tours 
to Toa Payoh New Town specifically for families affected by land clearances. These 
tours focused attention on the „”locality, environment and other aspects of new 
housing estates” and sought to familiarize the general population with the benefits of 
HDB housing estates
28
 as compared with the cramped and dilapidated housing 
conditions experienced by the majority. 
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Additionally, in line with the pragmatic stance of the State, material 
compensation was improved to further persuade the population to accept resettlement 
procedures and to encourage them to move into HDB estates. On 1
st
 July, 1971, a new 
resettlement policy was undertaken whereby instead of land allocation in a 
resettlement area, farmers were given a choice of either a free 3-room (improved flat), 
or a cash grant of $7,800 in addition to the enhanced compensation rates which were 
double that of previous rates and ex-gratia payments. Residential resettlement cases 
received ex-gratia compensation which was increased by 50 percent
29
. These 
improved benefits were substantial mitigated the criticism with regards to meager 
compensation rates under the Land Acquisition Act. These measures by the State had 
the overall effect of restricting the available housing options for the majority of the 
population, and the next stage was to provide the necessary incentives for the 
population to buy instead of merely renting HDB flats. 
 
3.2.2 Changing the Housing Expenditure Patterns of the Population: From Rental to 
Purchase 
 
The State needed to increase the population‟s propensity to purchase HDB flats 
as prior to 1968, the majority of HDB flats were rented out rather than sold, resulting 
in a scenario where there was no guarantee for the recovery of economic resources 
expended. The original objective of the HDB was to build low cost public housing for 
rental, but in 1964, an emphasis was made towards selling flats under a home 
ownership scheme which proved to be unsuccessful prior to the CPF Amendment Bill 
in 1968. Between 1964 and 1967, only 6,927 applications were made to purchase 
HDB flats while 54,203 applications were made to rent HDB flats. By the end of 
1967, 79,187 HDB flats have been constructed, but only 8.7 percent have been sold. 
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As such, with another planned 100,000 units of HDB flats to be constructed from 
1970 to 1975 under the Third Five-Year Plan (Yeung 1973: 47), and an ambitious 
target of 40 to 50 percent of the flats sold to homeowners in order to ensure a 
financially sustainable cycle of economic stimulus; the State needed to fundamentally 
alter the housing expenditure patterns of the population.   
Firstly, in a simple yet effective swoop, the CPF Amendment Bill (1968) made 
it clear that the only method of withdrawing CPF savings before the age of 55 (apart 
from death or permanent disability) was for the purchase of HDB flats. Specifically, 
CPF savings were only allowed to be used for HDB flats and not private properties 
(up until 1981); and expenditure on rental was not permitted under the scheme, while 
purchases were allowed to draw from CPF savings and future monthly contributions 
could be used to repay housing loan installments. Concurrently, earlier clauses which 
allowed a person who has not been an employee for more than two years the right to 
withdraw his/her CPF were discontinued
30
. Later attempts at requesting for CPF 
contributions to be allowed for use in paying rents for HDB was flatly denied
31
, 
consistent with the governmental rationality of promoting homeownership of publicly 
built flats rather than just financially uncommitted renters.  
The combination of the above measures which sought to narrow the viable 
housing options of the population and to shape their personal financial conduct 
towards governmental goals were extremely successful as was noted by E.W Barker, 
the then Minister for National Development. 
 
“The position today is entirely different and I put this down to the extensive 
concessions granted by the Government early last year, especially the 
availability of the Central Provident Fund monies. Previously one had to wait 
until one reached 55 years before drawing that money. Now everybody is 
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rushing to use his Central Provident Fund money, and hence the desire to 
purchase Housing and Development Board flats.”32 
 
In addition, as early as in July 1968, before the Amendment came into force in 
September, HDB provided incentives to encourage the purchases of HDB flats, while 
those who persisted in renting were subjected to inconveniences.  Sitting tenants were 
encouraged to purchase the flats they were residing in, and taking note of the low CPF 
balances in the majority of population, the Board reduced the down payment to 5 
percent of the purchase price of the flat which for a two-room or three-room flat 
amounted to a minimum of just $300, and in the case of a one-room flat to $100. 
Sitting tenants who persisted in renting rather than purchasing were subjected to 
„special arrangements‟ which resettled them in nearby blocks. These measures proved 
to be effective as by the end of the year, 14,041 units were sold, of which 4,716 units 
were purchased by sitting tenants
33
.From 1968 there was a marked shift in housing 
expenditure habits of the general population from a propensity to rent, to a propensity 
to purchase. By 1976, a total of $653 million or 61.3 percent of total CPF 
withdrawals
34
 had been withdrawn from the CPF for the purchase of public housing
35
, 
signifying that the CPF had fundamentally changed from being „enforced savings‟ to 
„encouraged spending‟ particularly on public housing36.  
The CPF hence embodied the social control of personal finance at both the 
individual and societal level. At the personal level, individuals were required to 
commit a portion of their monthly income, while at the societal level, social control is 
embodied by the mobilization of CPF reserves by the State for deficit financing as 
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required by the construction of HDB housing estates in the early years; and by the 
subsequent governmental attempts at regulating and directing CPF savings and 
contributions towards productive pursuits as sanctioned by the State.  
3.3.3 Evolution of the Technologies of Enforcement and Surveillance 
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45,588 70,599 880 0.81 1.57 
- Denotes that there is no available data 
*Denotes the number of employers who were formally warned    
Sources: Singapore, Central Provident Fund, Chairman‟s Statement and Accounts of the Fund, various years. 
 
In tandem with the State‟s initiative at expanding social control in the sphere of 
personal finance, the technologies of enforcement and surveillance were strengthened, 
further refined and applied more extensively to curb the increased non-compliance. 
By 1971, in order to facilitate the purchases of public housing, CPF contribution rates 
had doubled from 10 percent to 20 percent in the short span of merely 3 years. This 
increase in contribution rates was observed “to have resulted in an increase in the 
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number of employers who delay or who fail to pay the contributions
37”, and “it is 
envisaged that the number of infringements and offences will also increase, unless 
steps are taken to check this tendency
38.”  
To cope with this, firstly, greater statutory powers were requested for 
enforcement staff to enable them to perform their duties more effectively and the 
penalty interest rates for late payments was increased for greater deterrence
39
. These 
powers were approved and legislated by the CPF Amendment Bill (1973) which 
provided specific powers for enforcement officers to require employers to produce 
contracts of service, salary account books, registers and such other documents relating 
to the employment of employees in a bid “to strengthen the Board‟s enforcement 
machinery”40. Simultaneously, harsher penalties were imposed on employers who had 
deducted CPF contributions from the wages of his employees but failed to pay the 
required contributions to the Fund within the stipulated time
41
. 
Secondly, the CPF Board‟s Enforcement Branch underwent restructuring to 
systematically expand its reach and efficiency. In 1974 the Enforcement Branch was 
restructured and expanded to consist of 2 Divisions, namely the Area Division and the 
Survey Division. The Area Division was responsible for the regular enforcement of 
the provisions of the Act which included the enforcement of payment of contributions 
overdue and penalty interest, and investigations into claims for refund of contributions 
allegedly paid in error. The Survey Division was responsible for the planning and 
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implementation of surveys on employers either individually or by specific industry 
where the level of compliance with the Act was not satisfactory. The Division also 
assumed responsibility for investigation of complaints made by employees against 
employers who evaded payment or underpaid contributions
42
. The Survey Division 
sprang into action, targeting and conducting surveillance checks on 9 different groups 
of businesses where there were indications that the level of compliance with was not 
satisfactory.
43
 This restructuring thus allowed for a systematic administrative 
mechanism for tracking non-compliant employers and employees. In the next decade, 
the Survey Division conducted extensive surveys, especially among suspected non-
compliant industries, which consistently uncovered a greater than 50 percent rate of 
underpayment or evasion of contributions. 
Concurrently, the Enforcement Division stepped up its activities by increasing 
the number of visits to places of employment resulting in an all-time high ratio of 1.49 
enforcement visits per employer in 1971. While this ratio subsequently declined, 
another method of enforcement which utilized intimidation grew substantially. 
Especially after 1974, enforcement officers summoned employers/employees to the 
CPF Board office for interviews regarding non-compliance with the CPF Act. Instead 
of merely inspecting employers/employees at their workplaces where they were 
comfortable in and could easily mask practices of non-compliance; the psychological 
trauma that one generally associates with being summoned for investigation at the 
locality of a governmental office was systematically exploited. In 1970, 18,000 of 
such interviews were conducted and this increased to 54,832 in 1976. Even taking 
into account the growth in the number of active CPF accounts, the number of 
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interviews conducted as a percentage of the total number of active CPF accounts grew 
from 4.9 percent in 1970, to 6.5 percent in 1976.  
Viewed on a year to year basis, this percentage of suspected non-compliance 
with CPF contributions would not be a cause for alarm. However, as practices of 
underpayment and evasion would have existed undiscovered for periods before they 
are exposed, by interpreting the above figures with a „cumulative‟ perspective and 
accounting for the percentages of non-compliant employers in surveys conducted by 
the Survey Division, we can conclude that there existed a substantial degree of non-
compliance with the CPF. The above measures thus attempted to enforce compliance 
by establishing an overt and persistent presence of the State bureaucracy.  
Lastly, the CPF Board refined its administrative support for enforcement and 
surveillance by regularly upgrading its technological base. In November 1973, the 
Board placed an order for the purchase of a dual processor data entry system to 
replace the existing punch card equipment. The Board thus became the first 
organization in Singapore to completely convert to a computerized data entry system 
when the necessary equipment was delivered in early 1974. As can be recalled, the 
shift from book based accounting to a „computerized‟ punch card system allowed for 
casual labor to be included in the CPF; the shift from a punch card system to a more 
modern data entry system thus accommodated the substantial increase in surveillance 
undertaken which required an enlarged and more sophisticated structure for 
population data management.  
In summary, the expansion of the CPF system to include housing was not due to 
social welfare rationalities, but rather a response to the economic challenges faced by 
the British military withdrawal. The CPF system was successfully mobilized to 
stimulate the economy and to soak up unemployment by channeling collective 
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savings towards public housing expenditure and hence the stimulation of construction 
industries. In the following decades, the political legitimacy accrued from a successful 
housing policy which sought to engender stakeholding (Chua 1997) led to public 
housing becoming a permanent and primary fixture within the CPF. Not only were 
domestic savings productively mobilized for public housing, but future consumption 
patterns were fundamentally altered in this process of social engineering which 
involved both coercive and ideological means. As CPF contribution rates were 
gradually and consistently increased each year, it was not long before CPF 
contributions became a significant percentage of income and sought to incorporate 





Chapter 4: The Expansion of Explicit Social Control of Personal Finance 1977-
1985 
 
“I am not particularly alarmed by the fact that CPF contributions will go up 
to 50%. Each time the CPF rate went up in the past, there was the 
accompanying hue and cry. But are we not better off today or in the past? 
Have we not translated the savings into HDB flats for the people? Without a 
high saving rate, there would have been no public housing to the extent that 
we know of today.” Goh Chok Tong44 
 
The period leading up to 1985 can be described as a climb up the pinnacle of the 
overt social control of personal finance. While, the last chapter examined the CPF‟s 
expansion into housing provisions, this chapter will examine the period which marked 
the expansion of the State‟s overt social control of personal finance into the arenas of 
provisions for healthcare, investments and insurances. What was the rationale behind 
the increase of CPF rates to an all-time peak of 50%? Concurrently, why and how did 
the CPF evolved into a single scheme with 3 distinct accounts? Hence this chapter 
examines four interrelated developments, namely 1) the rationale and 
contextualization of the increase in contribution rates which hit a peak of 50 percent 
in 1984; 2) the concurrent expansion in prescribed functions within the CPF as 
exemplified by the structural segmentation into three separate accounts to meet 
anticipated demographical challenges; 3) the genesis of various schemes of 
investments; and 4) the expansion in scope of enforcement activities. The resultant 
effect of the implementation of these developments was the expansion of the 
bureaucratic regulatory mechanism and the beginning of an exponential increase in 
complexity such that the CPF system evolved into a „spaghetti bowl‟ of rules and 
regulations. 
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4.1Rationale for the Increase in Contribution Rates: Macroeconomic 
Management and National Investment Reserve 
 
Having creatively negotiated the initial economic peril of the unexpected British 
military withdrawal, Singapore went on to enjoy more than two decades of stunning 
and uninterrupted economic growth which has led many commentators to categorize it 
as one of the “Four East Asian Tigers” (Holliday and Wilding 2003), or the “Four 
Little Dragons” (Vogel 1991) which include South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
So effective was the PAP in ensuring economic development that within the first two 
decades of independence, Singapore‟s GDP multiplied almost 6-fold from S$8.8 
billion in 1965 to $51.3 billion in 1985, growing at an average rate of 9.2% per 
annum
45
. It was within this context of relentless economic expansion by which the 
entrenchment of PAP‟s political legitimacy was established, that political leeway was 
allowed for the CPF system to further expand in its scope, coming to bear the basic 
administrative structures and rationalities that it is currently recognized by.  
The consistent guiding ideology of the PAP, especially that of its most 
prominent leader, Lee Kuan Yew, was a disdain for „western-styled‟ pension fund 
schemes which possessed “inherent weaknesses such as heavy reliance on cross 
subsidy and inequitable distribution of benefits”46  that are costly to maintain and 
diminish work ethic. This is clearly demonstrated by the following excerpt in Lee‟s 
memoirs: 
“From 1955 to 1968 the CPF contribution had remained unchanged. I raised 
it in stages from 5 percent to 25 percent in 1984, making a total savings rate 
of 50 percent of wages. This was later reduced to 40 percent. The minister for 
labor was usually anxious to have the worker‟s take-home pay increased and 
would urge me to put less into the CPF. I regularly overruled him. I was 
determined to avoid placing the burden of the present generations‟ welfare 
costs onto the next generation.” (Lee 2000: 118) 
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Hence, in deliberating new schemes which expand the scope of social control, 
the key principle was to socially engineer a “built-in mechanism whereby each worker 
reaps what he sows,” and “the harder he works, the more he saves and the more he 
gets.”47 Within this context of economic growth and rising wages, the social control 
of personal finance was very deliberately and astutely practiced by steadily increasing 
CPF contribution rates to achieve the macroeconomic goal of controlling inflationary 
pressures during the economic boom. This governmentality which includes managing 
worker‟s expectations and consumption through an adjustment of CPF contribution 
rates is best exemplified by the following excerpt: 
“I therefore gave this scheme (CPF) my constant attention, making 
adjustments from time to time as market conditions affected wages, 
construction costs and the price of land. Every year, the National Wages 
Council recommended an increase in wages based on previous year‟s 
economic growth. Once workers got used to a higher take home pay, I knew 
they would resist any increase in their CPF contribution that would reduce 
their spendable money. So, almost yearly I increase the rate of CPF 
contributions, but such that there was still a net increase in take home pay. It 
was painless for the workers to keep inflation down.” (Lee 2000: 117-118) 
 
CPF as a Productive Development Fund and National Investment Reserve 
 
Apart from ideologically constructing a culture of self-reliance rather than State-
reliance for welfare provisions and for managing inflation, the CPF was also a social 
mobilization of personal finance for a national economic developmental fund without 
the drawbacks of incurring foreign debt. This was especially so in the first two 
decades after independence. CPF contributions and the resultant accumulation of 
substantial funds which was mandated to invest in Government securities was pivotal 
in providing the necessary economic resources for developing Singapore‟s physical 
infrastructure to facilitate industrialization. Challenges to the rationale for increasing 





CPF contributions by the opposition were swiftly put down and the crucial role of 
CPF savings in financing development was acknowledged by the PAP government.  
 
“If so, he (J.B Jeyaretnam) clearly does not understand how Singapore‟s 
economy works, and how CPF contributions play a pivotal role in our 
economic growth…… The rate of growth of an economy, that is, how fast new 
jobs are generated and people‟s incomes increase year by year, depends to an 
important degree on capital formation. This means the construction of new 
factories, installation of new plants and equipment, expansion of 
infrastructure – roads, ports, telecommunications, etc. building of houses and 
so on. These desirable facilities do not fall like manna from heaven…… They 
have to be paid for in hard cash. Of course, a government heading for 
bankruptcy can borrow from foreign banks in the Euro-market, for instance, 
at exorbitant rates of interest. Worse still, the government can print notes and 
the result is runaway inflation. Some governments do both these things and the 
country runs into big trouble. The PAP Government does not resort to 
trickeries of this kind. We know that capital formation must come out of 
savings by people and entrepreneurs. That is why over the years, rates of CPF 
contributions have proportionately been increased even as we have increased 
wages. The result has been a high rate of economic growth and an increase of 
both incomes and savings.”48  
 
In 1981, growing financial reserves comprising both CPF savings and public 
sector surpluses resulted in the formation of the Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GIC) with the objective of investing these funds to hedge against 
inflation and to obtain a fair return on capital (Lee 2000: 96-97). By the end of 1982, 
the total debt of the Government amounted to $20.7 billion, of which $19.9 billion 
was lent by Singaporeans, primarily through the CPF.
49
 The financial reserves of 
Singapore have been prudently accumulated and managed with the purpose of 
providing a collective saving for a „rainy day‟. Effectively, present-day financial 
reserves managed by Temasek Holdings, GIC and MAS have only been made 
possible by the CPF savings of the first generation of workers in Singapore. And 
while, these relatively large reserves have never been used, with the only exception 
being this current severe world-wide financial crisis; the greatest beneficiaries barring 
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corruption or mismanagement, would be the present and future generations of 
Singapore.  
While the PAP is expressly against cross-subsidies across generations as 
practiced by welfare state regimes, it has in essence practiced a „reverse‟ cycle of 
conventional inter-generational transfers, where instead of the present generation 
supporting the previous one, the savings of the previous generation essentially laid the 
foundation for the continued development of present and future generations. Instead 
of being a drain to national resources, the form of „social security‟ embodied by the 
CPF, provides a productive basis in contributing to a financial reserve which has been 
useful in developing the economic infrastructure of the nation. The social control of 
personal finance thus not just regulates the availability of disposable income of the 
working population; it funnels a substantial portion of employees‟ savings into a 
centrally managed fund which in the early decades was a source of development 
finances, and in present day, the basis of one of the largest sovereign wealth funds in 
the world.  
4.2 Structural Segmentation into 3 Separate Accounts 
 
Table 4.1: CPF Contribution Rates and Contributions to Various Accounts, 
1977-1985. 
Year Contribution Rates (%) Contributions to Various Accounts (%) Total  
Employer Employee Ordinary  Special Medisave 
1977 15.5 15.5 30 1 - 31 
1978 16.5 16.5 30 3 - 33 
1979 20.5 16.5 30 7 - 37 
1980 20.5 18 32 6.5 - 38.5 
1981 20.5 22 38.5 4 - 42.5 
1982 22 23 40 5 - 45 
1983 23 23 40 6 - 46 
1984 25 25 40 4 6 50 
1985 25 25 40 4 6 50 
1986 10 25 29 - 6 35 
       





The Need for a „Special Account‟ 
 
The State was so successful at changing the housing expenditure patterns of the 
population through regulating the utilization of CPF savings that by the end of 1976, 
it realized that the original intention of the CPF as a modest retirement fund was in 
jeopardy. As of 31
st
 December 1976, 70.8% or 481,788 active members of the CPF 
had balances of less than $5,000. These members had a total of $837.85 million, 
giving only a paltry $1,814 per member
50
. These low balances were attributed to the 
unrestricted access of CPF funds for purchase of HDB flats. Hence, to ensure that 
members have sufficient savings left for retirement withdrawal after providing for 
public housing expenditure, CPF contribution rates had to be increased and 
restrictions had to be placed on the amount of CPF savings that could be used for 
housing expenditure
51
. As more and more CPF savings were withdrawn for housing, a 
demarcation was required to guarantee that the traditional role of retirement provision 
was protected (Low and Aw 2004: 58-59). As a result, the distinction between an 
“Ordinary Account” (OA) and “Special Account” (SA) was formally created on 1 
July 1977. While majority of the CPF contributions were channeled into the OA 
which could be withdrawn for housing schemes; CPF contribution rates was increased 
by 1 percent, and this increase was “credited into Special Accounts from which 
members were not allowed to withdraw for the purchase of flats.”52 CPF contribution 
rates were subsequently increased and contribution rates to the SA reached a high of 7 
percent in 1979.  
This recommitment to retirement funding however did not last long. Despite, 
efforts at increasing savings for retirement through the SA, retirement provisions 
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often took a lower priority when other contingencies arose. This is exemplified by the 
following 3 incidents. 
Firstly, in a bid to ease the slump in the private residential property market, the 
Approved Residential Properties Scheme (ARPS) which  allowed CPF savings in the 
OA to be withdrawn for the purchase of private properties was introduced in 1981 
(Low and Aw 2004: 101-102). In conjunction, contributions paid to the various 
accounts was readjusted accordingly with contributions to the OA increasing from 32 
to 38.5 percent while contributions to the SA fell from 6.5 to 4 percent in order to 
further enhance the amount of savings available to members for property purchases
53
. 
The portion reserved for retirement provisions was thus reduced reflecting contextual 
governmental priorities. Secondly, when the Medisave Scheme came into effect on 1 
April 1984, it was legislated that the entire balance accumulated in each member‟s SA 
be transferred to his Medisave Account. Furthermore, the 6 percent contribution once 
allocated to the Special account was now instead credited to the Medisave Account, 
while the Special Account - reflecting pure savings for retirement – was allocated a 
lower contribution rate of 4 percent
54
. In this case, the immediate need of funds for 
medical provisions took precedence over the need for retirement provisions. Finally, 
when Singapore faced its first economic recession in 1985, contributions to the SA 
was temporarily stopped altogether and members were allowed to use savings in the 
SA to service housing loans if their OA were exhausted
55
. These incidents 
demonstrate that direct saving for retirement was not the CPF scheme‟s priority, and 
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Healthcare Provisions: The Medisave Account 
 
“We could…… have had six percent as health insurance, not credited to any 
personal account. Then everybody will get free medical treatment. 
Theoretically, it should work……. In practice, it will be as disastrous as health 
insurance schemes in America or Europe. For there would have been no sense 
of one‟s own responsibility……” Lee Kuan Yew 1984 National Day Rally 
Speech, quoted in CPF (2000: 29).   
 
In 1984, the scope of the social control further enlarged when the CPF expanded 
its functions through the creation of a third account, the Medisave Account (MA). 
With rising standards of living, improvements in medical service and health, citizens 
were expected to live longer, resulting in a demographic shift and creating a greater 
demand for costly healthcare services. In 1982, there were 183,000 persons over 60 
years or 7.4% of the population, and by the year 2000, it was estimated that there will 
be 306,000 persons over 60 years or about 10.4%, an increase of 123,000 elderly 
Singaporeans
56
. In 1980, there were 6.4 persons working and paying taxes per senior 
citizen, but by 2000, it was projected that there would be only 4.5 persons per senior 
citizen, resulting in a population pyramid that is increasingly top heavy
57
. Hence, in 
anticipation of this expected demographic shift, the MA was created in 1984 by 
channeling the balances from the SA, hence expanding the CPF into a trinity of 
accounts within a single system. This abrupt transfer of savings was to provide 
Singaporeans with funds which they could use immediately to pay for their personal 
hospital bill
58, or to meet their immediate family‟s hospital expenses (CPF 2000: 14).  
The PAP was determined to avoid the European welfare model of „free 
medicine‟ which it believed led to an “unrestrained growth in demand, spiraling 
health costs and of course queuing for services.” 59  Hence, consistent with the 
ideological anti-welfarist foundations of the PAP State, contributions were credited to 
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the individual‟s accounts and to prevent premature depletion, withdrawals were 
allowed for hospitalization expenses but not outpatient treatments. Even when 
catastrophic health insurances (Medishield) was subsequently introduced in 1990, co-
payments and deductibles were prominent features that the State ensured were 
included in health insurance contracts to prevent abuse and overconsumption of 
medical services. With an aging population and increased affluence, it was estimated 
that the major portion a person‟s life-time hospitalization expenses would be incurred 
after the age of 55; hence in order to prevent a drain on governmental resources, it 
was necessary that unlike the other CPF accounts, the Medisave account cannot be 
withdrawn when the account-holder reaches 55.
60
  
Hence, beginning in 1977 and by 1984, the CPF had structurally segmented into 
a three-in-one scheme, with distinct accounts, each serving a specific function as 
determined by the State. The OA was primarily for housing purchases, the SA 
reserved for retirement savings, and the MA was set aside for hospitalization expenses 
of personal and family members. This thus marks the crystallization of the 
rationalities and administrative structures of socially regulating personal finance with 
the objective of individualizing responsibility for social security.  
4.3 Genesis of the Schemes of Investments  
Approved Residential Properties Scheme 
The period between 1977 and 1985 saw a gradual liberalization of CPF savings 
for investment purposes with 2 major schemes, the Approved Residential Properties 
Scheme (ARPS) and the Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd Shares Scheme. The 
ARPS which allowed the withdrawal of CPF savings and contributions for the 
purchase of private residential properties was finally approved in principle by the 
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Acting Minister for Labor on 28 November 1980 for the purposes of hedging against 
inflation
61
. Residential properties purchased under this scheme could either be used by 
the member for his own occupation or for rental. However, like its public housing 
counterpart, this long awaited approval was after many years of petitioning, and in 
this case, at least partially motivated by a need to ease the excessive supply and slump 
in the private property market. Repeated calls by members of parliament for the 
release of CPF monies for private residential properties were made in 1971, 1974, 
twice in 1975, 1977, 1979
62
, and even as late as in June 1980
63
; however, these 
requests were flatly rejected on the rationale that the release of CPF savings for 
expenditure on private residential properties would result in widespread speculation 
which would end up with a loss of hard earned savings of members to the benefit of 
developers and property speculators.  
It was not until the real estate slump and the appeal from the Singapore Land 
and Housing Developers Association who submitted a study undertaken by the 
Applied Research Corporation that CPF monies were allowed to be withdrawn for 
purchase of private residential properties. A key policy recommendation by the 
consultants of the study was to allow the full use of CPF contributions for the 
purchase of all private properties in order to ease the excessive supply and resulting 
slump in the private property market (Low & Aw 2004: 101-102). In the first phase 
which came into effect on 1
st
 June 1981, members were allowed to use up to 90% of 
his CPF savings in the Ordinary Account to redeem the whole or part of the 
outstanding mortgage on one residential property. In addition, members were allowed 
to use up to 90% of their CPF contributions to their Ordinary Account towards the 
monthly installment repayment. In the second phase, effected on 1
st
 January 1982, the 
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scheme was extended to allow members to use 90% of their CPF savings and monthly 
contributions to make purchases for a private residential property
64
.  
Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd Shares Scheme 
Earlier in 1978, the government had revamped and privatized the SBS, and the 
Singapore Bus Service (SBS) Shares Scheme introduced on April 26, 1978 enabled 
members to use their CPF savings, up to a limit of $5,000, to purchase SBS shares 
listed on the stock exchange. Shareholders who held at least 1,000 shares were 
entitled to concessionary travel on SBS buses and a 7.5% dividend was also promised 
by the State
65
. Members who sell their shares are required to refund back to the CPF 
the amount withdrawn, or the proceeds of the sale, whichever is lesser
66
. 
While the SBS Shares Scheme was probably an administrative predecessor to 
the more complex investment schemes developed later which allowed CPF members 
to invest in a variety of financial instruments; the rationalities beneath it was quite 
unique compared to the investment schemes which proceeded it. Apart from wanting 
citizens to benefit financially from the privatization of a major public transportation 
service, the State felt that it was in the “public interest that the large commuting 
public and bus employees should take a direct interest in the policy and management 
of the public transport system.” Hence, as most of the working class population would 
lack the financial means to invest directly with cash, CPF savings were legislated to 
be allowed to be used for the purchase of SBS shares
67
. The governmental rationality 
behind was later explicitly revealed to be twofold: firstly, was the altruistic objective 
of enabling the widest share ownership so that the working class could enjoy the 
profits of a profitable public transport business. Secondly, it was the governmental 
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mechanism of co-opting the working class by reducing the “incentive to demand 
cheaper bus fares and government subsidies for public transport.”(Lee 2000: 124-125) 
4.4 Enforcement and Surveillance 
As the overt social control of personal finance expanded both in terms of the 
nominal rates of contributions and the range of functionalities, surveillance and 
enforcement activities hit a peak in this period.  
The evasion of payment of CPF contributions was still widely practiced. 
However, with the growing societal acceptance of the benefits of CPF as a mechanism 
for homeownership, employees became more receptive to the idea of CPF 
contributions and enforcement activities shifted towards gaining compliance from 
employers. In July 1977, a 1.5 year program covering a total of 3,641 employers from 
8 of the groups of business with the highest incidence of omissions/underpayments 
was launched to enforce compliance
68
, and this practice became an annual practice 
from 1979 to 1985 targeted at industries with a high percentage of errant employers. 
Particularly, the Survey Division found that a high percentage of employers in 5 
industries, namely, Textile & Wearing Apparel, Plastic, Rubber Products, Electronic 
and Electrical, had been found to be late in making contributions
69
. A summary of the 
surveys from 1979 to 1985 is presented below. Among the employers surveyed, 
consistently more than half were found to be non-compliant in paying CPF 
contributions.  
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4.2: Summary of Survey Results 1979-1985 













1979 23 2,604 1,854 71.2 
1980 10 2,652 1,991 75.1 
1981 39 2,570 1,802 70.1 
1982 51 3,304 2,187 66.2 
1983 6 3,382 2,157 63.8 
1984 8 1,850 1,347 72.8 
1985 5 2,140 1,220 57.0 
     
Sources: Singapore, Central Provident Fund, CPF Annual Report, various years. 
 
Interviews with suspected non-compliant employers/employees hit a high of 
172,814 in 1983 from 70,599 interviews at the beginning of this period in 1977, 
before drastically tapering off from 1984 onwards
70
. The exact reasons for this 
dramatic drop in number of interviews from 1984 onwards is not revealed in official 
publication, but a possible reason could be that the large number of interviews 
conducted between 1982 and 1983 uncovered a mountain load of leads on suspect 
employers to be followed up upon. This which later led to an avalanche of criminal 
prosecutions in the next 4 years, from 1984 to 1987 before enforcement statistics were 
discontinued. In total, 20,731 employers were criminally prosecuted in these 4 years, 
or almost double compared with a total of 11,184 recorded criminal prosecutions from 
1958 to 1983
71
. The percentage of employers criminally prosecuted for non-
compliance with the CPF Ordinance hit a peak of 10.49% in 1986, indicating a 
substantial degree of resistance by employers. 
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Hence, within this period, the coercive and regulatory aspect of the CPF reached 
its pinnacle with the peak in both contribution rates and enforcement and surveillance 
activities. Concurrently, the CPF system was structurally segmented into 3 distinct 
accounts within a single system, each with its officially prescribed function in order to 
meet anticipated demographical challenges of an ageing society. Together with the 
genesis of investment schemes which gradually liberalized the uses of CPF savings, 
the CPF system gradually evolved into a multi-faceted system with increasing 
bureaucratic complexity.  
 65 
 
Chapter 5: Limited Contribution Rates, but Expanding 
Functionalities 1986- 1998 
 
Causes of the First Recession in Singapore (1985) and the CPF 
 
The recession of 1985 was particularly significant to the psychological 
disposition of the PAP leadership as the theme of „economic vulnerability‟ was once 
again revived. This recession was projected as “a watershed in our economic 
development” which marked “the end of an era of high growth and relatively easy 
progress”, and the beginning of an era which highlighted the “uncertainties and 
dangers of an economy that is overwhelmingly dependent on international trade.”72 
The limits of continually increasing CPF contribution rates was rudely exposed and 
policy makers now had to deal with the challenge of balancing limited contribution 
rates with an ever expanding list of both individual welfare needs and governmental 
goals in mobilizing societal savings. In short, policy makers had to grapple with doing 
more, but with less direct control over individuals‟ finances. 
After two decades of uninterrupted economic growth, 1985 marked the first 
recession experienced when Singapore‟s economy contracted by 1.7%, and was then 
expected to post no growth in 1986
73
. Three main causes of this recession were 
highlighted in the Report of the Economic Committee released in February 1986. 
Firstly, external global factors such as the slowdown in computer peripherals and 
electronics exports to the US, and structural changes in oil and marine related 
manufacturing industries due to low oil prices affected Singapore‟s manufacturing 
industries adversely. Secondly, the increase in business costs, in particular labour 
costs, were not matched by productivity growth, hence adversely affecting 
Singapore‟s international competitiveness and the profitability of companies‟ 
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operations within her. Thirdly, the report identified the weakness in domestic demand 
caused both by the construction slump and the “continued high rate of national 
savings that cannot be channelled into productive domestic investments.”74  
While external factors could not be controlled or avoided, the second and third 
causes of this recession revealed certain policy deficiencies closely linked to the past 
success of the CPF system. Firstly, the increasingly high CPF contribution rates which 
peaked at 50% (25% each from employers and employees) in 1985, was identified as 
one of the main culprits for inflating wage costs
75
 which rose twice as fast as 
productivity from 1981-1985
76
. While increasing contribution rates were intended to 
expand the scope of the CPF‟s provisions and to mitigate inflationary consumption 
pressures, it also had the effect of inflating wage costs as the liability for employers‟ 
contributions were gradually but significantly raised from 5 to 25%. As a result, from 
1979-84, Singapore‟s competitive position weakened 50% against Hong Kong, 15% 
against Taiwan and 35% against Korea
77
.  
Secondly, while the linkage of the CPF with housing schemes had earlier 
provided the population with affordable and quality housing, and had soaked up 
unemployment, it also led to the overinvestment into construction and property 
development, and this hindered productivity growth. Domestic demand fell drastically 
during the recession due to the slump in the construction sector which had enjoyed a 
decade of government induced boom due to the “greatly accelerated HDB housing 
programme” which “obviously could not be sustained.”78 As the report noted,  
“Even while the construction boom lasted, we should have become alarmed 
that a third of our economic growth each year derived from construction, as 
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this trend obviously could not be sustained. Now that the boom is over, the 
construction slump has brought us even more severe problems.”79 
 
Especially since the liberalization of the CPF system under the Approved 
Residential Properties Scheme, it was noted that since 1980, a major proportion of 
investments into gross capital formation had been funnelled into the construction and 
property development sector. In 1984, $11.4 billion or 63% of total capital formation 
was in construction; and out of this, $6.2 billion or more than half was invested in 
residential developments
80
. These investments in residential developments proved to 
be excessive as they did not generate a good rate of economic returns, but instead 
diverted a large portion of savings rate away from more productive investments like 
capital equipment and machinery.  Hence, the over-extension of CPF policies that 
successfully negotiated the earlier perilous economic period of British military 
withdrawal set the stage for the nation‟s first severe recession. 
This chapter hence focuses on 5 key developments which occurred with the 
CPF system within this period whereby although contribution rates were limited by 
economic circumstances, the scope and functionalities of the CPF continued its 
expansion in line with governmental goals. These developments are namely, 1) the 
utilization of the CPF contributions as a national wage management tool and the 
enforced revision of long term contribution rates; 2) the restriction of withdrawal at 
the previously determined age of 55 through the Minimum Sum Scheme; 3) the 
mobilization of CPF savings to stimulate the financial industry; 4) the CPF Top-Up 
Schemes as a mechanism for garnering political support; and 5) the discursive shift 
from a schema of surveillance and enforcement to a service provision orientation.  
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5.1 CPF as a National Wage Management Mechanism and the Revision of Long 
Term Targeted Rates  
 
“If we do not have enough CPF savings, how are we going to reduce labour 
cost by 15% in a recession? ...... Which country in the world has been able to 
do this in times of recession by reducing labour cost rapidly?”81 
 
With the impact of economic globalization and stiff competition from the other 
East Asian economies, the decision was made to enforce a collective nationwide wage 
cut by enforcing a reduction of CPF contributions. Below, Table 5.1 displays the CPF 
Contribution rates and the respective allocations to various accounts in this period. 
Table 5.1: CPF Contribution Rates and Allocations to Various Accounts, 1985-
1998. 
Year Contribution Rates (%) Allocations to Various Accounts (%) Total  
Employer Employee Ordinary  Special Medisave 
1985 25 25 40 4 6 50 
1986 10 25 29 - 6 35 
1987 10 25 29 - 6 35 
1988* 12 24 30 - 6 36 
1989 15 24 30 2 6 38 
1990 16.5 23 30 3.5 6 39.5 
1991 17.5 22.5 30 4 6 40 
1992** 18 22 30 4 6 40 
1993 18.5 21.5 30 4 6 40 
1994-
1998 
20 20 30 4 6 40 
 
Note *: From 1988-1991, the above listed contribution rates refer to contribution rates for those aged below 55    
years old.  
**: From 1992-1997, the above listed rates refer to contribution rates and allocations for those aged below 35. 
Contribution rates remain the same up to age 55, but with slight variations in their allocation to the various 
accounts.  
Sources: Singapore, CPF, CPF Annual Report, various years. 
 
The CPF Amendment Bill (1986) was passed in April to swiftly implement the 
changes recommended from the Report of the Economic Committee
82
. To directly 
tackle the loss of competitiveness due to high wage costs, for the first time, 
employers‟ CPF contribution rates were drastically cut by 15% points. CPF 
contributions thus became a national mechanism for wage management as this 15% 
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point cut immediately and significantly reduced wage costs by 12%
83
. The brilliance 
of this measure was that wage reduction was accomplished without any 
accompanying social-political unrest as take-home pay which is the psychologically 
more important component to employees, was unaffected by this measure. 
Consequently, once the societal acceptability of the logic of CPF had been 
internalized, CPF hence acted as a platform to socially regulate the wage levels of 
workers and contributions acted as a potential buffer for wage reduction measures in 
times of economic recession. 
As shown in Table 5.1, this 15% point cut comprised an 11% cut in 
contributions towards the OA, and a 4% point cut in the SA. SA contributions was 
completely reduced to zero, and in order to prevent the short term default of 
mortgages, existing SA balances were mandated to be allowed for the repayment of 
housing loans for CPF members whose OA was depleted. A year later, the strategy of 
using the SA as a “buffer which can be more readily adjusted in a recession”84 was 
crystallized. However, when the request was tabled for CPF savings to be released for 
a subsistence level of unemployment relief, it was immediately rejected as the 
Minister for Labour stated that, “jobs are still available if they (Singaporeans) are 
prepared to make the necessary adjustments,” and that the release of CPF savings for 
the unemployed will be akin to, “giving opium to a person who is in pain, only to turn 
him into a drug addict.” 85 Hence, individual responsibility for healthcare and housing 
provisions were perched at the top of the hierarchy of social needs, the long term goal 
of retirement provisions through contribution into the SA was accorded the lowest 
priority, and measures for unemployment relief was not even on the table for 
negotiation. 
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Concurrently, with this renewed mentality of „economic vulnerability‟ and 
„pragmatic survivability‟, it was proposed that the PAP leadership should re-evaluate 
the projected long term CPF contributions rates bearing in mind the basic objectives 
of the CPF Scheme, and not over-extend itself beyond the point of economic 
sustainability. In 1987, after careful study and consideration, the state had little choice 
but to lower its goal of 50% total CPF contribution rates to a long term target of 40% 
for members below age 55. Additionally, in order to encourage firms to continue 
employing older workers, contribution rates were now differentiated by age with CPF 
contribution totalling 25% for those aged 55 to 60, 15% for those aged 60 to 65, and 
10% for those above 65 years old
86
. This proposed reduction in long term contribution 
rates was actuarially calculated to be just sufficient for the 3 basic objectives of 
housing, Medisave and a very „subsistence type‟ of retirement where remaining CPF 
balances was estimated to provide retirement income of only approximately 20-40% 
of last drawn take-home pay (Most financial planners advocate a rate of 60-70% of 
last drawn income. Even after the economy recovered and GDP rebounded sharply at 
an average annual growth rate of 10.1% from 1987 to 1990
87
, the State was very 
cautious and gradual in restoring CPF contributions in phases as can be seen from 
Table 5.1. This was done for the fear of hurting wage competitiveness and greater 
vigilance was taken to ensure that wage increases corresponded to increases in 
productivity
88
. Hence, the limitation of infinitely expanding CPF contributions was 
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5.2 Restriction of Complete CPF Withdrawal at Age 55: The Minimum Sum 
Scheme 
 
 “The prudent ones would regulate the spending, over their retirement years, 
of the CPF savings which they drew out at retirement age in one lump sum. 
However, there may be many who do not have the expertise to invest and 
manage large capital sums. Many are known in fact to have lost their savings 
overnight through speculation. They then become a financial burden to others 
and the State.”89 
 
The genesis of the rationalities for rescinding and restricting the right for 
complete withdrawals of CPF savings at the age of 55 can be found in the 
controversial Report of the Committee on the Problems of the Aged, or the Howe 
Report which was published in February 1984. The Howe Report controversially 
recommended that the withdrawal age for CPF savings be “raised from 55 to 60 and 
later to 65”, in line with the governmental rationality of raising retirement age90. A 
less publicized (and politicized) recommendation, was for CPF to implement and 
encourage members to participate in an optional annuity scheme using part or whole 
of their CPF balances. This would ensure a steady and modest income for the rest of 
the retiree‟s life91. The rationale for these recommendations was substantiated by 
anecdotal evidence of CPF members who had squandered their CPF savings soon 
after withdrawal through misplaced investments or just pure frivolous spending. 
These recommendations met with widespread disapproval as CPF members perceived 
the PAP as breaking an important social contract that has been established since the 
CPF‟s inception. The suggestion of an optional annuity scheme, although financially 
prudent was largely overshadowed by the public outcry over the proposed increase in 
withdrawal age.  
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Noting the widespread public outcry against raising the withdrawal age and its 
correlation with the political performance of the PAP in the December 1984 general 
election where the percentage of valid votes won by PAP fell from 77.66% in 1980 to 
64.83% in 1984, and for the first time since independence, 2 opposition members 
were elected in parliament (Peebles and Wilson 2002: 279); a hard-line approach 
towards this issue would have been a political minefield. However by 1986, with 
economic realities restricting PAP from pursuing its ideal target of 50% contribution 
rates, the potential problem of insufficient retirement provisions for a population that 
was living longer was a real one, especially given the majority amounts that have been 
withdrawn for housing schemes which included the permission to draw down on 
Special Account balances to cope with mortgage repayments.   
The Minimum Sum Scheme (MSS) was thus a politically more palatable 
initiation towards balancing the governmental goals of ensuring lifelong self-
sufficiency among retirees with the population‟s desires for self-determination. On 1 
January 1987, the MSS was initiated to “protect a portion of the savings of CPF 
members, so that they will at least have a minimum income to fall back on after age 
60.” 92 Members can withdraw their “entire savings” from the CPF Board, but only 
after setting aside $30,000 for an individual, and $45,000 for a married couple. This 
minimum sum forms the Retirement Account (RA) which acts as a safety net by 
providing for a monthly payment of at least $230 from age 60, until the Minimum 
Sum plus interest is exhausted. For married couples, the monthly income is at least 
$345. Savings in the RA can be used to buy an approved annuity, deposited with an 
approved bank, or retained with the CPF
93
. Thus faced with constraints on how much 
CPF contributions they can extract from employers and employees due to an altered 
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economic outlook, the MSS was introduced to provide for a subsistence type of 
retirement provision.  
Table 5.2: Schedule for Minimum Sum Scheme 
CPF Balance (Excluding 
Medisave) 
Amount Withdrawn  
Less than  $10,000 Member can withdraw all of the CPF balances. 
$10,000 -  $20,000 Member can withdraw up to $10,000 and set aside the 
remainder 
$20,000 - $60,000 Member can take out half of the CPF balance and set 
aside the remainder. 
Greater than $60,000 Member needs only to set aside $30,000 and can withdraw 
the remainder 
Source: Singapore Legislative Assembly, Debates Official Reports. Vol. 48, 25 August 1986, Col 525-
526 
 
To ensure societal acceptance, or at least to alleviate discontent, generous 
clauses were included which allowed CPF members to withdraw some portion was 
included as shown in Table 5.2. In addition, properties can be pledged in lieu of the 
Minimum Sum. While allegations that the Government had difficulties making good 
on CPF withdrawals and that the Government was “rescheduling their own debts” 
were made
94
, these were very unlikely to given the robust foreign reserves and budget 
surpluses that the Government consistently accumulates.  
The MSS was hence the mechanism whereby the paternalistic State sought to 
extend a certain degree of control over individuals‟ personal finances even when they 
were past retirement age, or from the time an individual begins employment to the 
time one enters into the grave. Although initially lenient in terms of the amount of 
CPF savings retained as the minimum sum, this scheme was clearly conceived with a 
long term goal of gradually increasing the minimum sum, while reducing the amount 
that can be satisfied through the pledging of properties
95
. After an initial consolidation 
phase, on July 1995, the State announced measures to progressively increase the 
minimum sum by $5,000 a year, from $40,000 in 1995 until it reached $80,000 in 
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2003. Concurrently, the amount that has to be pledged in cash instead of property was 
steadily increased from by $4,000 a year to reach $40,000 in 2003 (Low and Aw 
2004: 60).  
5.3 CPF Investment Schemes: The Mobilization of CPF Savings to Develop the 
Financial Sector 
 
“Would the Minister now consider it wrong to allow CPF members to use 
their CPF money to buy shares in the stock exchange, people whom the Howe 
Yoon Chong Report not so long ago would like us to believe that they could 
not be trusted to look after their own savings and yet they are now allowed to 
participate in the stock exchange casino, speculating away their hard earned 





“The CPF Investment Scheme has in no small way helped strengthen 
Singapore‟s fund management and investment banking sector.” 97 
 
Just as CPF savings had been mobilized, with the consent of the population who 
participated actively in PAP‟s housing programs to stimulate the construction 
industries and to soak up unemployment in the 1970s; the period after the 1985 
recession saw a concerted effort by the State once again in mobilizing CPF savings as 
part of an overall strategy to develop Singapore into a regional financial centre akin to 
London, New York and Tokyo. The eventual liberalization of the large pool of CPF 
funds provided an attractively ready and potentially persuadable market for the 
financial industry to easily tap into.  
In a tentative bid to allow CPF members the flexibility to manage their own 
savings
98
, albeit only when they have accumulated a minimum reserve, and arguably 
to stimulate the depressed stock markets, the Approved Investment Scheme (AIS) was 
introduced in May 1986
99 . Signifying the State‟s cautious nature in allowing 
individual discretion, the AIS initially only allowed members to use 20% of their 
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„investible CPF savings‟, which was defined as the “balance in the Ordinary and 
Special Account in excess of the reserve of $30,000”100 (inclusive of the amounts 
withdrawn for housing), for investments in trustee and other approved shares, 
convertible loan stocks, unit trusts and gold. It was estimated that 347,000 members 
were eligible to participate, and that $2.4 billion worth of funds could potentially be 
withdrawn from the CPF for such investments
101
. In November 1986, to facilitate a 
greater participation in this scheme, the withdrawal limit was raised from 20% to 40% 
of investible CPF savings
102
. Concurrently, the Securities Industry Bill (1986) was 
passed to regulate the activities of the fund management industry, which was expected 
to expand with the release of CPF savings for securities investments
103
.  
Spurred by the findings from the Report of the Economic Committee, the AIS 
was an initial experimentation with channeling CPF savings towards more productive 
investments. This had the intended effect of stimulating growth in the financial 
industry, with the intention of diversifying the large amounts of savings away from 
properties and construction, and into the development of Singapore as a regional 
financial centre. Additionally, investments into state approved stocks and unit trusts 
which were initially limited to the local Singapore stock exchange would theoretically 
provide the necessary finances for key local businesses to invest in capital equipment 
which would upgrade productivity. Investors would then benefit through dividend 
payouts and from capital appreciation. 
The AIS however did not catch on immediately as a year later, less than 5 
percent of members‟ investible savings had been invested104. This can be attributed to 
the immaturity of financial knowledge among the general population and the initial 
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apprehension over the bureaucratic complexities with regards to what can be invested 
in, and how much is allowed to be invested. In addition, some potential investors 
probably would have left their funds with the CPF to conveniently form the low risk 
segment of their portfolio as the investible limits was still low and returns from CPF 
while not exceptional, were guaranteed.  
Further Liberalization 
By February 1993, only 104,000, or 14% of the eligible 740,000 members had 
withdrawn savings for investment, and $2.1 billion or only 15% of the $14 billion 
available was invested
105
. Hence, to further encourage CPF members to invest, in 
October 1993, the Government further liberalized this scheme by raising, the 
investible limit from 40% to 80% of their gross savings in excess of the Minimum 
Sum, and by allowing for more risky investment options. The AIS was differentiated 
into 2 schemes, the Basic Investment Scheme (BIS) and the Enhance Investment 
Scheme (EIS). Under the BIS, a member can use up to 80% of his investible savings, 
after setting aside a minimum reserve of $40,000 to invest in trustee shares, loan 
stocks and unit trusts. However, only 10% of this may be invested in gold and non-
trustee shares listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore. Members who opt for the 
EIS have to set aside a higher minimum reserve of $50,000 in their Ordinary and 
Special Accounts. Additional financial instruments including shares listed on 
SESDAQ
106
, government bonds, bank deposits, fund management accounts and 
endowment insurance policies are allowed under the EIS
107
.  
The real bait that lured CPF members into investing their CPF savings was 
however the decision to allow members to annually withdraw capital gains and 
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dividends from investments which exceeded the CPF Board‟s interest rate108. By the 
end of 1994, the number of members who had invested their CPF savings more than 
tripled to 339,070 members who invested a total of $9.9 billion of their CPF savings, 
and in the same year, 53,865 or about 15% of those who invested had successfully 
withdrawn $207.2 million in profits through their agent banks
109
. This legally 
permitted premature cash withdrawal mechanism successfully provided an incentive 
for members to invest their CPF savings
110
.  
Further steps at liberalization of CPF savings for investment with the aim of 
attracting foreign investment firms were undertaken when in 1995, fund managers and 
unit trusts under the EIS were allowed to invest in foreign stocks and bonds traded in 
the Stock Exchange of Singapore. This follows a three stage plan with each stage 
allowing for more investments overseas such that by 1999, fund managers under the 
CPF investment Schemes would be allowed to invest in selected regional and capital 
markets outside of Asia
111
. From January 1997, the BIS and EIS were merged to form 
the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) to simplify the investment rules and 
regulations
112
. By the end of 1998, 6 years after the liberalization program took off, 
the number of members who invested had grown by more than 4 times to 464,198, 
and the gross invested amount had multiplied by more than 11 times from $2.1 billion 
to $24.4 billion
113
. This channeling of CPF savings into financial investments played 
no small part in developing Singapore into the regional financial centre that it is 
today. 
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An Immediate Stimulus for Commercial Properties 
Another change was made under the CPF Amendment Bill (1986) as a method 
of combating the slump in commercial properties during the recession. The Non 
Residential Properties Scheme (NRPS) was passed to combat the oversupply of 
commercial properties and as a limited measure to aid small local business owners in 
acquiring their own commercial properties. In addition to the earlier schemes which 
enable the purchasing of residential properties, CPF members were now allowed to 
use their CPF savings to invest in non-residential properties such as office premises, 
shops, factory units and warehouses
114
. It must be noted that 2 decades later, in July 
2006, the NRPS was phased out probably due to the need to restrict CPF withdrawals 




5.4 CPF Top-Up Schemes as a Mechanism for Garnering Political Support 
 
“This is how it works. Imagine that we incorporate a company called 
Singapore Incorporated, or Singapore Inc., to own and run Singapore. All 
Singaporeans are employees of Singapore Inc. But they are also shareholders. 
Each one has one share. In other words, Singaporeans, both you and I, work 
for and own Singapore Inc. The Government is the Board of Directors of 
Singapore Inc...... The profit is economic growth.” 116 
 
Once the economy growth recovered, beginning in 1993, the new buzz word 
that the State sought to discursively and materially associated with the CPF was „top-
up‟. Apart from being a distributive mechanism for budget surpluses, this was also 
aimed at reversing earlier negative perceptions of the State trying to „lockup‟ the 
nations‟ CPF savings.  Between 1993 and 1998, an amazing slew of 10 CPF Top-Up 
Schemes which distributed well over $2 billion among CPF members was initiated as 
a form of dividend payout from what Goh Chok Tong described as the “Singapore 
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Inc”.117 While the publicly announced goals of these top-up schemes are varied, the 
primary purpose that underpinned all of them was to consolidate political support and 
to achieve the social effect of engendering stakeholdership in the Singapore Inc. The 
PAP government started to develop its own brand of welfare redistribution, more 
accurately described as „workfare‟. Out of a total of 10 CPF Top-Up Schemes 
occurring between 1993 and 1998, 7 required some form of corresponding member 
contribution into the CPF. Although members can voluntarily contribute to the CPF 
even if they are not employed, this measure still indirectly favours members who are 
gainfully employed. It was further announced that providing Singapore‟s economy 
continued growing and the Government accumulates fiscal surpluses, benefits would 
be distributed via the CPF periodically. Table 5.3 summarizes the terms and 
conditions of the various CPF Top-Up Schemes. 
 
(Continued on next page)
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Table 5.3: Summary of CPF Top-Up Schemes from 1993-1998 










 Share Ownership 
Top-Up Scheme 
$200 Top up into the OA for a 
contribution of $500 from members. 




 Share Ownership 
Top-Up Scheme 
$300 Top up into the OA for a 
contribution of $750 from members. 
Lesser amounts are pro-rated. 
1.40 415.0 
1995 CPF Top-Up Scheme Every Adult Singaporean with a CPF 






Top up of between $100 and $350 
(depending on age) for Singaporeans 
aged 61 and above who contributed $50 




 Medisave Top-Up 
Scheme 
Every Adult Singaporean with a CPF 






Top up of between $100 and $350 
(depending on age) for Singaporeans 
aged 62 and above who contributed $50 




 Share Ownership 
Top-Up Scheme 
$300 to $500 top-up into the OA 
(depending on NS status) for a 




 Medisave Top-Up 
Scheme 
$100 top-up for members aged between 
21 and 59, $200 top-up for members 






Top up of between $100 and $350 
(depending on age) for Singaporeans 
aged 63 and above who contributed $20 






Top up of between $100 and $350 
(depending on age) for Singaporeans 
aged 64 and above who contributed $20 
into their MA. 
0.178 52.1 
Source: Singapore, CPF, CPF Annual Report. Various years. 
 
4 types of CPF Top-Up Schemes were implemented. The SOTUS and the CPF 
Top-Up Scheme, concurrent with the further liberalization of CPF investment 
schemes in 1993 and the Singapore Telecommunications Ltd Group A discounted 
shares scheme, was aimed at turning all Singaporean citizens into a share-owning 
class who owned blue chip shares of selected profitable Singapore enterprises hence 
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giving Singaporeans a “greater stake in the country.” 118  The top-ups into the 
Medisave accounts are a testimony to Goh Chok Tong‟s longstanding concern with 
healthcare provision. The Pre-Medisave Top-Up Schemes implemented between 1995 
and 1998 were aimed at rewarding senior citizens in recognition of their role in 
establishing Singapore‟s economy and to boost their balances in the Medisave which 
were generally low due to the short accumulation period. The Medisave Top-Up 
Scheme was similar, but included all adult Singaporeans. 
The resultant evolution with regards to the CPF was that it was now also a tool 
by which a measure of political support is garnered through financial disbursements 
because of its administrative sophistication and reach. 
5.5 Discursive Shift in Disciplinary approach: From Enforcement to Services 
Provision 
 
Lastly, 1987 saw a significant discursive shift from the direct antagonistic tone 
of enforcement procedures to a more conciliatory service provision orientation which 
was no less intrusive, but much more sophisticated in emphasizing the internalization 
of compliance by employers and employees. The philosophical underpinnings of such 
a radical shift began in 1986 with the formulation of CPF‟s statement of corporate 
philosophy “Striving for Excellence” 119. This statement focused the CPF Board‟s 
thrust and commitment to develop the CPF into a comprehensive social security 
savings scheme with the provision of quality service to clients by proficient and 
motivated staff. Thereafter, in January 1987, this was formalized when the Finance 
Department and the Enforcement Department were replaced with the Member 
Services Department and Employer Services Department respectively, to reflect the 
emphasis on service provision
120
.  
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Subtle measures which remind employers and employees of their status of 
compliance with CPF contributions were introduced under the guise of service 
provision. These include annual member‟s statement of accounts which was then 
increased in frequency to a 6-monthly statement which showed monthly transactions 
being issued. In addition, the employer relations program which included talks and 
discussions with employers and their associations, and free training given to payroll 
staff on computation and payment of CPF contributions was initiated in 1987 to 
inculcated greater social responsibility among defaulting employers
121
. Concurrently, 
the CPF PAL, a major phone-in service which enables convenient access to 
information on members‟ personal accounts was extended to all active CPF members 
in 1987
122. This had the effect of motivating employees to keep track of employers‟ 
contributions as they could access financial statements that reflected their growing 
wealth. In a further emphasis on service provision, in 1991, a team of specially 
selected and trained Customer Service Officers “smartly attired in their blue and green 
uniforms” took over CPF counters in the CPF Main and Branch offices123.  
Consequently, statistics for enforcement and surveillance proceedings was 
stopped with the last ones published in 1987. From 1988, the statistics presented were 
instead ones that listed the percentages of employers and employees who rated the 
CPF Board‟s services as „satisfactory‟. These percentages were consistently above 
95%, although the validity of such surveys can be challenged as being bias towards 
the CPF Board. Nevertheless, default rates were observed to consistently fall from 5% 
to 1.5% in 1998, and further falling to 0.54% in 2007
124
, hinting that such a policy 
shift was successful in gaining compliance.  
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In summary in this period, the CPF system was mobilized as a national wage 
management mechanism to improve productivity by slashing labor costs, and 
tentative steps were taken to mobilize CPF savings to stimulate financial sector 
development. In order to still satisfy the collective necessity for retirement security, 
steps were gradually taken to restrict withdrawal conditions through the Minimum 
Sum Scheme. Coupled with the above discussed barrage of CPF Top-Up Schemes 
and the shift in enforcement approach, the discursive construction of the population 
shifted from being „subjects‟ to „clients‟, and the societal acceptance and hence 
successful institutionalization of the CPF was achieved. This eventually resulted in 
the present situation where despite some minor grievances, acceptance and 
compliance with CPF contributions have been approved as beneficial by the 





Chapter 6: Refocusing the CPF and Social Control of Personal 
Finance Beyond the CPF 1999-2009 
 
 
While much fruitful academic research has been done on the public provision of 
social security and welfare (Asher 1991; Esping Andersen 1990 and 1996; Low and 
Aw 2004), these in general have either neglected the role of private financial 
institutions in accomplishing the goals of the state, or have examined private pensions 
purely in the context of occupational welfare terms (Greve 2007). Hence, this chapter 
seeks to firstly examine the developments within CPF which sought to enforce a 
greater degree of control, especially for the lower classes and secondly, to examine 
the social control of personal finance beyond the scope of the CPF to elucidate the 
role of the life insurance industry in welfare provision for the middle and upper-
middle classes. 
Historical Contextualization: A Decade of Systemic Uncertainty  
 
This period up to present times can be understood as a decade of systemic 
economic uncertainty. With financial innovation, the widespread adoption of 
information/communication technologies which facilitates globalization, and the 
effects of terrorism, the global economic cycle appears to be hyper-accelerated and 
accentuated. Beginning with the collapse of the Thai Baht, the Asian Financial Crisis 
quickly enveloped the region with a contagion effect, and although Singapore 
eventually emerged relatively unscathed due to its sound fiscal and financial systems 
(Peebles and Wilson 2002: 19), it still sank into its second recession in 1998 with real 
GDP declining by 1.4%
125
.  
The CPF was once again utilized as a national wage management mechanism 
with employers‟ contribution rates reduced from 20% to 10% on 1 January 1999, 
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reducing the overall CPF contribution rate from 40% to 30% in order to put off 
retrenchments
126
. While, the original intention was to progressively restore the 
contribution rates towards the targeted 40 percent rate after at least two years when 
the economy recovered
127
; a solid economic rebound which saw Singapore post GDP 
growth of 7.2% in 1999 and 10.1% in 2000 allowed contribution rates to be partially 
restored, first by 2% in 2000, and a further 4% in January 2001 allowing for CPF 
contribution rates to reach 36% (16% employer, 20% employee).  
However, in 2001, the September 11 terrorist attacks precipitated a severe 
downturn in worldwide economic activity, with international trade and investments 
adversely affected resulting in an even more severe recession in Singapore where 
GDP declined by 2.4%. Terrorism was brought closer to the Southeast Asia theatre 
with the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005 adversely affecting tourist arrivals and 
negatively affecting trade and investments in the region. Furthermore, the impact of 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the Iraq War led to a GDP 
contraction of 1.1% in the first half of 2003, and a modest CPF rate reduction from 
36% to 33% was effected to stave off a full-blown recession
128
. As a result of these 
factors, recovery was mild in 2002 and 2003 where economic growth chugged along 
at 4.1% and 3.8% respectively
129
. Economic growth finally recovered strongly with 
GDP growing at an average of 8.2% per annum from 2004 to 2007, but CPF 
contribution rates was only modestly restored in July 2007 from 33% to 34.5%
130
. 
However, any prolong economic growth is again stopped in its tracks with the current 
ongoing subprime financial crisis which is already the most severe worldwide 
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recession since the Great Depression. Coupled with the trend towards relocating 
manufacturing to lower cost destinations, Singapore‟s continued economic growth can 
no longer be assumed and pressure for employers‟ CPF contribution rates to be kept 
low to manage wage competitiveness intensified over the years. The result was that 
the long-term targeted CPF contribution rate of 40% had to be foregone in place of a 
flexible system which allows CPF rate to vary from 30-36% depending on economic 
conditions. This restriction thus necessitated a shift towards refocusing CPF towards 
providing for an appropriate consumption of housing, healthcare and a greater 
emphasis towards a very modest retirement due to Singapore‟s ageing demographics.  
However, this restriction in pursuing an overt social control of personal finance 
does not imply that the State was no longer intent on achieving a considerable level of 
social control of individuals‟ finances. A more nuance analysis reveals that beginning 
in 1999, based on the recommendations of Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) on the 
Ageing Population, and further crystallized in the recommendations of the Economic 
Review Committee (ERC), the state began a 2 pronged approach in regulating 
individuals‟ finances.   
Firstly, for the majority of the middle and lower classes, the State enforced a 
greater degree of social control on the „first portion‟ of individuals‟ finances through 
what the IMC termed as the “basic needs Central Provident Fund Model”131 and what 
the ERC termed as “refocusing the CPF”132. This was practically achieved through 
refinements in the Minimum Sum Scheme, the implementation of the HDB Lease 
Buyback Scheme, and the soon to be implemented CPF Life. Secondly, the State 
sought to establish social discipline beyond the CPF by promoting and legitimizing 
the private financial services as a complementary system. This was primarily aimed at 
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the middle and upper-middle classes who could afford some type of financial plans 
offered by the private sector. Beyond the basic CPF schemes applicable to the general 
population, a greater degree of freedom and choice was promoted to further 
individualize the responsibility for welfare provisions.  
I argue that a key evolution in the governmentality of regulating individuals‟ 
finances in this period was that the State began to utilize the life insurance industry as 
one of the key intermediaries to accomplish the governmental goals of 
ensuring/insuring healthcare and comprehensive retirement provisions outside of the 
CPF system, especially with respect to the better-off population segment. This subtle 
approach aims to regulate individuals‟ finances through the self-internalization of the 
ideology of financial planning, and had the benefit of productively further developing 
the financial services sector. 
6.1 Refocusing the CPF System and a Greater Degree of Control for the Lower 
Class 
 
“So, Members……, I need you to spout poetic lines to convince your 
constituents that these measures are meant to help 
them.  Spew forth with passion your Hokkien lyrics and poetic metaphors.” Th




The effect of lower CPF contribution rates coupled with the „new economy‟ 
where „life-long continuous employment‟ is no longer assured, led to the IMC 
recommending that the State adopt a „basic needs CPF model‟134. The “basic needs 
CPF model‟ aims to provide for a subsistence level of retirement provisions, basic 
medical provisions and housing. To operationalize this, in 2002 the ERC 
recommended that the CPF be „refocused‟ by increasing the Minimum Sum and 
strengthening the provisions for healthcare provisions
135
. In essence, the State 
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attempted to refine the CPF such that it would exercise a greater degree of social 
control on individuals‟ first portion of accumulated savings up to a level which the 
State deems sufficient for individuals‟ basic needs. This which can be measured by 
the amount retained under Minimum Sum Scheme (MSS), the Medisave Minimum 
Sum (MMS), and most recently the CPF Life Scheme. These schemes are specifically 
aimed ensuring individual responsibility and at preventing the lower class from falling 
under the need for State-sponsored welfare by regulating CPF withdrawals and 
gradually phasing out lump sum CPF withdrawals for the majority of the population. 
6.1.1 Minimum Sum Scheme 
Table 6.1: Minimum Sum Scheme and Medisave Minimum Sum  











1999 60,000 20,000 40,000 17,000 67,000 
2000 65,000 25,000 40,000 19,000 84,000 
2001 70,000 30,000 40,000 21,000 91,000 
2002 75,000 35,000 40,000 23,000 98,000 
2003 80,000 40,000 40,000 25,000 105,000 
2004 84,000*  
(84,500 after inflation adjustment) 
42,250 42,250 25,500 110,000 
2005 88,000* 
(90,000 after inflation adjustment) 
45,00 45,00 27,500 117,500 
2006 92,000* 
(94,600 after inflation adjustment) 
47,300 47,300 28,000 122,600 
2007 96,000* 
(99,600 after inflation adjustment) 
49,800 49,800 28,500 128,100 
2008 100,000* 
(106,000 after inflation 
adjustment) 
53,000 53,000 29,500 135,500 
2009 104,000* 
(117,000 after inflation 
adjustment) 
58,500 58,500 32,000 149,000 
2010 108,000* TBA TBA TBA TBA 
2011 112,000* TBA TBA TBA TBA 
2012 116,000* TBA TBA TBA TBA 
2013 120,000* TBA TBA TBA TBA 
Source: Singapore, CPF, CPF Annual Report, Various Issues.  
*Denotes sum in 2003 Dollars 
TBA: To be announced.  
 
As examined in the previous chapter, the MSS was established in 1987 to 
prevent members from „squandering‟ their entire CPF lump sum upon the withdrawal 
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age of 55 by withholding a minimum sum which provides for a constant monthly 
income from the stipulated drawdown age which was gradually increased from 60 to 
65 years old. Due to the consistent budgetary surpluses and the vast reserves within its 
disposal, the State was able to „buy out‟ members, or at least mitigate their 
unhappiness by offering „Deferment Bonus‟ (D-Bonus) to those who are affected by 
this increase in drawdown age; and „Voluntary Bonus‟ (V-Bonus) for those who 
volunteer to defer their drawdown age. The D- and V- Bonus are expected to cost the 
Government up to $650 million and $570 million respectively
136
. 
Initially set at $30,000 in 1987, the minimum sum was gradually raised by 
$5,000 a year to reach $80,000 in 2003. In 2004, the MSS was again progressively 
raised from $80,000 to reach a targeted $120,000 (in 2003 dollars) by 2013
137
. This 
further increase in minimum sum was not to control for inflation as inflation has 
already been accounted for by pegging the MSS in terms of 2003 dollars; rather it was 
to force CPF members to set aside a larger sum of money. Table 6.1 details the 
increase in the stipulated Minimum Sum since 1999, and the proportions that were 
allowed to be pledged in cash and property. When the MSS was first initiated, 
property pledges was allowed for the full minimum sum. However, the maximum 
amount allowed for property pledges was gradually reduced to 50% while the 
minimum cash portion was gradually increased over the years to reach 50%. In the 
event that the property pledged is sold, individuals must refund the minimum sum 
deficiency, or the principle CPF withdrawn for the pledged property plus the interest 
accrued, whichever is lower in order to fulfill the MSS.  















Table 6.1 also details the increase in the MMS over the last decade. In 1999, the 
MMS was $17,000; by 2009 this had almost doubled to reach $32,000. The MMS was 
the amount that was required to be set aside in the Medisave Account for life; this 
sum could neither be withdrawn at any age, nor could any property be pledged to 
fulfill it. In essence the MMS represented the amount the State deems a member needs 
to self-provide for healthcare provisions from age 55 onwards.  
Table 6.2: Percentage of Active Members meeting required Minimum Sum at 
age 55. 
 




As Table 6.2 shows, since 2000, consistently less than half of the active 
members turning 55 were able to meet the required minimum sum. It was noted that 
in 2005, only 40% of active CPF members who turned 55 were able to meet the 
minimum sum, and of these, only 20% were able to meet the minimum sum fully in 
cash
139
. By 2008, the statistics revealed that due to the increasing minimum sum 
required, only 33.8% of active members turning 55 were able to meet the minimum 
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sum. As a result of a decline in percentage of members who could achieve the 
required minimum sum, this which had been earlier projected, it was announced in 
2003 that withdrawals below the Minimum Sum at age 55 will be progressively 
phased out from 2009 to 2013
140
. From January 2009, the “50% withdrawal rule” 
where members can withdraw up to 50% of their Special and Ordinary Account 
balances even if they fail to meet the minimum sum was reduced to only 40%. This 
percentage will decrease by 10% annually, until 2013, when CPF members would not 
be allowed to withdraw any savings unless they meet the required minimum sum
141
. 
As a result, from 2013 onwards, it is expected that the majority of CPF members 
would not be able to withdraw any lump sum from their CPF accounts.  
Hence, the State has tightened its control over the majority of the population‟s 
retirement provisions by regulating the disbursements of CPF savings in a controlled 
fashion rather than allowing for lump sum withdrawals, effectively holding the reins 
on individuals‟ first portion of accumulated savings. This „first portion‟ has more than 
doubled from $67,000 in 1999, to $149,000 in 2009, and coupled with the phasing out 
of the “50% withdrawal rule”, represents a increase in social control of individuals‟ 
finances, particularly those from lower classes. 
6.1.2 The HDB Lease Buyback Scheme and CPF Life: A Property Based Social 
Security System 
 
The culmination in securing and regulating individuals‟ finances for their entire 
life is the HDB Lease Buyback Scheme (LBS) and the CPF Life. With the realization 
that the earlier successes of its housing policies has left many Singaporeans “assets 
rich but cash poor”, the LBS, a form of reverse mortgage was launched in March 
2009. This scheme is primarily targeted at the lower classes, specifically elderly 2 and 
                                                          
140
 SLAD. Vol. 83, 27 August 2007, Session 1, Sitting 9. Col 1345 
141
 http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/1CD89DEC-1CD2-4772-83CE-
F6D2B65F3467/0/CPFTrendsMinimumSum_2008.pdf CPF Trends: Minimum Sum Scheme. Accessed 
on 22 June 2009.   
 92 
 
3 room flat owners who need help to monetize their properties for retirement 
provisions. 25,000 households or 70% of elderly households owning 2 and 3 room 
flats were estimated to be eligible for the scheme
142
. Under this scheme, the HDB will 
buy back the tail-end of the lease of the flats leaving the household with a shorter 30 
year lease. Additionally, the household would receive a generous subsidy of $10,000 




The catch was that apart from the $5,000 cash lump-sum payment, the 
homeowner would have to cede the remainder value to purchase the CPF Life annuity 
plan to secure a lifelong income stream. This is consistent with the State‟s 
paternalistic belief that lower income classes should not be allowed to handle lump-
sums of money. The State gave assurances that no elderly would be left homeless 
should the flat-owner outlive the remainder 30 year lease, and that should the lease be 
terminated prematurely because the elderly has passed away, his/her estate will 
receive a pro-rated refund on the residual lease
144
. Alternatives for such lower income 
households are severely limited. While some of these households may try to rent out a 
room in their flat for some income, the reality is that 2-3 room flats are usually not 
very desirable in the rental market  and even if possible would not fetch a very good 
yield. With the implementation of the LBS, the CPF completes the circle as a property 
based social security system as the poor are able to have a modest retirement income 
together with adequate housing, and although generous subsidies are provided, 
individual responsibility is still the cornerstone in this system.  
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As medical technology improves, members were projected to have longer life 
expectancy and as the MSS was only projected to provide for 20 years of drawdown, 
a lifelong annuity program was deemed necessary to ensure self-sufficiency. 
Following the recommendations of the National Longevity Insurance Committee 
(NLIC), the CPF Life Scheme, an annuity scheme administered by the CPF Board and 
based on principles of risk-pooling, will be launched in September 2009. While there 
is no requirement of a minimum balance to join the CPF Life, members aged 50 or 
younger in 2008 and having at least $40,000 of CPF savings at age 55 will be 
automatically included. All other members can opt in to the scheme
145
. It was 
estimated that 70% of the members turning 55 in 2013 would be auto-included
146
. 
While the NLIC initially recommended 12 types of annuities, this was eventually 
narrowed down to 4 types to avoid an overwhelming number of choices which would 
lead to decision paralysis by members
147
. The 4 plans, namely, LIFE Basic, LIFE 
Balanced, LIFE Plus and LIFE Income offer slightly differing monthly payouts and 
bequest amounts to beneficiaries should the member pass away prematurely, with 
LIFE Basic offering the lowest monthly payout but highest bequest amounts, and the 
LIFE Income on the other extreme offering the highest monthly payout, but no 
bequest amount at all. Payouts will start at 65 years old for all 4 plans offered, and to 
attract members to participate in the CPF Life, especially members with lower CPF 
savings, the State will provide a one-off LIFE Bonus (L-Bonus) of up to $4,000 
(depending on one‟s income and value of home) for members in the first five cohorts 
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Further details on the implementation of the CPF Life will be announced as the 
implementation date draws closer, but with the launch of the CPF Life, it is likely that 
the MSS would gradually be merged with the CPF Life to form a compulsory state-
managed annuity scheme aiming to eventually regulate the disbursement of the „first 
portion‟ of individuals‟ CPF savings. This hence has the effect of regulating the 
expenditure patterns of particularly the lower classes by preventing unregulated 
access to their accumulated lump sums.  
6.2 Social Control beyond the CPF: Promoting and legitimizing the Private 
Financial Services Sector 
 
In 1999, a key discursive shift occurred as the IMC on Ageing Population 
articulated its recommendations to refine the CPF. Public sector provisions by the 
CPF were realized to be limited due to the downward pressure on contribution rates 
due to demands for economic competitiveness. Concurrently, the reality of a 
demographic transition was consistently emphasized by the State. In 1999, only 9% of 
the population or 235,000 people was estimated to be aged 65 and above. However, 
by 2030 this number would rise to 796,000 or 19% of population
149
. As rapid 
economic growth had given rise to a middle class majority, the State recognized that 
the CPF would not be able to provide sufficiently for the retirement expectations of 
this class of the population.  
As such, the IMC recommended that significant efforts be undertaken to 
promote the private financial sector as a complementary system to the CPF
150
. 
Consequently, CPF contribution salary ceiling (the salary amount up to which CPF is 
payable) was reduced from $6,000 to $4,500 by January 2006
151
 so as to keep 
business costs competitive for high income earners, as well as to allow higher income 
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earners more freedom to manage their finances beyond the basic needs provided by 
the CPF. 
3 factors aid in understanding why the life insurance industry evolved to be the 
primary mechanism for complementing the CPF system. Firstly, life insurance 
policies and annuities like the CPF scheme are not as liquid financially as other 
options like bank deposits, securities and stocks. While withdrawal is possible, a 
significant financial loss would usually occur and this acts as deterrence against 
premature withdrawals before retirement. Secondly, in terms of social control, life 
insurance policies like the CPF scheme usually entail a regular monthly payment. As 
such, this requires an acceptance of the ideology of consistent disciplining of personal 
financial habits. Lastly, from a governmental perspective, life insurance products by 
virtue absolve the State of liabilities it would otherwise incur should individuals meet 
with a misfortunate accident, critical illness or death. Hence, financial liabilities are 
transferred from the State to the individual and from the individual to private insurers.  
This active legitimization and promotion of the financial sector as a complement 
to the CPF was practically pursued through a 3 pronged approach. 
6.2.1 Regulating the Financial Sector: Financial Advisers Act (2001) 
 
Firstly, the IMC recommended the creation of a “conducive regulatory 
framework”152 which would safeguard consumers and legitimize the industry. This 
was manifested in the Financial Advisers Act (FAA) that was passed in October 2001 
and came into force on 1 October 2002. The FAA set out to regulate Financial 
Advisers and their representatives and was legislated to govern all financial advisory 
activities with respect to investment products, and the marketing of specific 
investment products namely, life insurance policies and collective investment 
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schemes across all financial institutions including banks, life insurance companies, 
insurance brokers, and independent advisers
153
. The fundamental objective was to 
professionalize the industry and to “create a new class of licensed financial advisers” 
who would not just be commission-driven personnel selling unit trusts and 
investment-linked products, but would “be able to provide investment advice on a 
wide array of financial products.”154 The FAA began a process of „upskilling‟ in its 
emphasis on minimum education standards, training and upgrading of knowledge and 
technical competency, and a needs based sales process. As such, the introduction of 
the FAA by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) was a watershed event with 
respect to the life insurance and financial services industry. 
The life insurance sector was quick to cooperate with the State and leverage on 
this governmental action in a bid to rebrand itself. As a result, an „episteme‟ shift was 
observed as the life insurance institutions transformed into the „personal financial 
services‟ sector.  
“…… aside from insurance policies, they can offer advice on assets such as 
shares, bonds and unit trusts, and goals such as retirement planning. With 
that, the term 'insurance agent' is well on the way out, to be replaced by 
'financial planner' or 'financial adviser'.”155  
 
„Insurance agents‟ were discursively reconstructed to become „financial 
planners/advisers/consultants‟; „life insurance policies‟ became „retirement plans‟. 
This discursive shift was necessary to secure the required legitimacy and credibility to 
be the dominant private institution for individual welfare provision. By 2005, this 
reconstruction was almost complete and it was widely noted that „financial planning‟ 
or „retirement planning‟ was now the new buzzword156. Between 2003 and 2007, life 
insurance companies aggressively marketed these „financial plans‟ to the general 
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population when its agency sales forces and bancassurance distribution channels set 
up weekly „financial planning‟ road shows across the island, in bus interchanges, 
outside MRT stations, and in shopping malls. When they were first launched, these 
road shows were extremely effective with financial advisers reporting that they could 
close an average of one financial plan from a day‟s work at a road show. However, 
this success tapered down by 2007 as its innovation wore off and consumers came to 
understand the tactics of „financial planners‟ conducting surveys and got turned off. 
The daily routine of being prospected by „financial planners‟ on one‟s way home after 
work became an irritation instead of service provision and closure rates fell 
drastically.  
While the FAA did spark a process of professionalization and an improvement 
in technical knowledge and competency among financial advisers, it fell short of 
altering the base remuneration structure which was still primarily commission based. 
As such, financial planners are still basically sales personnel pressured by 
management sales quotas and often motivated to push products which yield the 
highest commission rates. This hence limits the credibility of the financial services 
industry.  
6.2.2 Promoting the Ideology of „Financial Planning‟: Internalizing Self-Discipline 
 
Secondly, a comprehensive public education program was initiated by the CPF 
Board to advance the internalization of the ideology of „financial/retirement planning' 
so as to inculcate self-discipline in personal financial habits. The basic tenets of the 
ideology of „financial planning‟ was that one needed to invest in long term financial 
plans, and that the best method of investing is by subjecting oneself to the disciplinary 
structure of regular investment plans which coincided usually with the individual‟s 
monthly remuneration. Emphasis is placed on individuals‟ to be responsible for their 
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own retirement provisions, rather than rely on traditional familial ties or governmental 
provisions. 
This was done by highlighting the need for those who can afford it to purchase 
private retirement plans early in life. The key message articulated by the CPF Board 
from 1999 onwards was “Take Charge. Plan Early. Secure Your Retirement”157. The 
CPF Board was hence mobilized along with other government agencies to promote 
awareness of the products and services of the financial sector to “help people save, 
invest and provide financial security through the whole cycle of life.”158  
Since mid-2000, the CPF Board has formed a partnership with the Ministry of 
Community Development and Sports, and the Financial Planning Association of 
Singapore to raise public awareness of financial planning through public seminars and 
newspaper columns. Additionally, the CPF Board initiated an advertising campaign 
for the financial services sector when it produced a publication titled “Benefits of 
Financial Planning” and mailed it to 980,000 households within its database in order 
to reinforce the importance of individual responsibility for retirement planning. In 
2002, the CPF Board organized a campaign with a seminar on “Financial Planning 
during Turbulent Times”. Print and broadcast media was also mobilized to propagate 
the ideology of „financial planning‟ and the CPF Board initiated a series of 
educational talks with the private sector to encourage Singaporeans to start early 
financial planning. In October 2003, the CPF Board together with the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, Ministry of Manpower, Ministry of Community Development 
and Sports, Ministry of Education and People's Association launched a national 
financial education program called „MoneySENSE‟ to raise the level of financial 
literacy. „MoneySENSE‟ cover topics such as money management, financial planning 
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From 2004, the public education program evolved into an annual public 
roadshow, “My CPF & Me”, held at the Toa Payoh HDB Hub160. Primarily targeting 
HDB heartlanders, public seminars were conducted in English and the main 
vernacular languages to reach out to the elderly. Financial institutions such as banks, 
stock brokers, independent financial advisers, and life insurance companies were 
invited to tender for booths which would provide on-the-spot facilities to process sales 
of any financial products. These booths were populated with financial advisers from 
respective companies striving to sell to consumers who thronged the roadshow. Free 
gifts like cash vouchers and electronic products were widely touted to lure consumers 
to make a commitment to financial plans. Unsurprisingly, life insurance products 
were the ones primarily being promoted to consumers by banks, independent financial 
advisers and life insurance companies, as these were the ones that paid the highest 
commission rates. 
Furthermore, effort was made to target students so that the ideology of financial 
discipline would be instilled while they were young, and that they would “become 
financially prudent adults.”161 From 1998, the CPF Board in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Education made efforts to educate junior college students under a 
National Education Program entitled „CPF and You‟ which aimed to educate students 
about the CPF Scheme and its role in Singapore‟s nation-building162. Students from 
polytechnics were targeted through the „MoneySENSE‟ program when in 2006, 
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33,000 poly students attended roving carnivals organized to “teach younger members 
important financial planning concepts and CPF matters.”163 
 
6.2.3 CPF Investment Schemes (CPFIS) and Medishield as a Practical „Opener‟ for 
Financial Advisers 
 
Lastly, in conjunction with a favorable regulatory and ideological framework, 
portions of individuals‟ CPF savings were permitted to be withdrawn for various 
investment and healthcare products through the CPFIS and Medishield which were 
progressively liberalized. The resulting effect was that this created a practical „opener‟ 
for financial advisers to utilize as an opportunity to initiate contact with prospects. 
The direct market that the CPFIS and Medishield scheme immediately opened up for 
financial institutions was but the tip of the iceberg. It soon became industry practice to 
use CPFIS or Medishield schemes to establish initial contact with clients as this was 
relatively easy to sell due to the conducive environment created by public education, 
and also the fact that they involved little or no cash transactions but relied primarily 
on CPF funds. After securing the sales for products related with the CPFIS or 
Medishield, financial advisers would proceed to cross-sell endowment policies, 
whole-life insurance policies and regular premium investment plans, these which are 
termed as „cash cases‟. This allowed financial advisers to substantially increase their 
sales production. 
The State realised that some form of safeguard was required to protect CPF 
members, especially those with low CPF balances from being overly invested in 
context of the volatility of the financial markets. It was hence legislated that from 1 
April 2008, the first $20,000 in one‟s OA and the first $20,000 in one‟s SA cannot be 
invested. From 1 May 2009, this ruling was further tightened such that the first 
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$30,000 in the SA is safeguarded
164
. Nevertheless, when prospecting customers 
affected by this ruling, financial advisers could still use the „Medishield route‟ which 
involves selling very attractively priced enhancement plans which provided 
comprehensive hospitalization coverage on top of the basic tier of Medishield, to gain 
access to prospects. This was made possible from October 2005 when private insurers 
were allowed to offer enhancement plans to the basic tier of Medishield coverage as 




Growth of the Life Insurance /Financial Services Industry as an Intermediary of the 
State 
 
The private life insurance industry and the public social security apparatus of 
the state hence exists in a dialectic relationship. Within its governing rationality, the 
state utilizes the private insurance industry as an intermediary to accomplish its 
governmental goals particularly for the better-off segment of the population. The 
private insurance industry leverages on the legitimacy of the State and its ideologies 
directed towards financial/retirement planning, reaping the lucrative rewards of 
aggressively capturing a market by means of persuasion rather than coercion. On the 
other hand, consistent with its paternalistic practices particularly towards the lower 
class, the CPF system was refined to enforce a greater degree of control on 
individuals‟ finances by phasing out lump sum withdrawals and moving towards a 
compulsory annuity program. 
(Continued on next page)
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Table 6.3: Financial Assets Held by Singaporean Households in S$ Millions, 
2000-2005 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Currency & 
Deposits 
130,725 139,963 137,610 141,245 134,238 146,132 
Shares & Securities 72,253 66,841 69,169 87,116 97,028 104,390 
Equity in Life 
Insurance 
31,659 44,371 50,510 57,761 64,675 73,105 
Equity in 
CPF/Pensions 
90,327 92,256 96,459 103,570 111,901 120,604 
Total Financial 
Assets 
324,965 343,431 353,748 389,692 407,842 444,232 
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics, Occasional Paper on Economic Statistics, Singapore 
Household Balance Sheet: 2005 Updates and Trends. June 2006. 
 
A conceptual distinction in the categories shown in Table 6.3 should be noted. 
The first two categories, currency and deposits, and shares and securities are more 
liquid in nature and can be easily liquidated; in contrast, equity in life insurance and 
the CPF cannot be easily withdrawn, and for life insurance policies, these are usually 
undertaken for long-term financial goals of protection and retirement provision. As 
such, an analysis comparing CPF savings and equity in life insurance is appropriate as 
their function closely approximates each other, and hence this section‟s emphasis on 
the role that the life insurance industry plays in achieving the governmental goals of 
disciplining personal financial habits.  





Table 6.4: Statistics Comparing CPF Contributions and Fund Holdings with 
Total Life Insurance Annual Premiums and Total Assets of Life Insurance Fund 
(1997-2008) 














1998 15,999.8 85,276.8 4,468.6 21,847.8 
1999 12,826.6 88,396.9 4,680.5 28,453.3 
2000 14,092.8 90,298.3 5,071.6 34,761.3 
2001 18,322.4 92,221.2 5,221.9 47,916.7 
2002 16,165.7 96,422.6 5,417.9 54,216.1 
2003 15,870.0 103,539.6 5,547.9 63,720.0 
2004 15,320.1 111,873.8 5,869.6 71,835.8 
2005 16,105.1 119,787.5 6,377.9 83,563.4 
2006 16,547.1 125,803.8 6,710.5 93,030.7 
2007 18,185.0 136,586.9 7,167.7 105,384.0 
2008 20293.6 151,307.1 7,735.7 91,999.1 
Source: Singapore, CPF, CPF Annual Report, various years. 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/data_room/insurance_stat/Insurance_Statistics.html Insurance Statistics, 
Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
 
As Table 6.3 shows, a trend can be discerned towards the increasing amount of 
equity held in life insurance by Singaporeans. While in 2000, equity in life insurance 
was only 35.0% of equity in CPF/pensions, by 2005, this had increased substantially 
to 60.5%. Table 6.4 highlights the growth of the life insurance industry by detailing 
total members‟ funds in CPF and the total assets of the life insurance fund. From 1998 
to 2008, total CPF members‟ funds in CPF had grown from $$85.3 billion to $151.3 
billion, or by 77.4%; in the same period, the total assets of the life insurance fund had 
increased from $21.8 billion to $92.0 billion or by 321%, even taking into the 
significant plunge in values due to the stock market crash in late 2008. In the same 
period, Yearly CPF contributions grew by 26.8% from $16.0 billion to $20.3 billion 
while total annual premiums for life insurance grew by 73.1% from $4.4 billion to 




These statistics suggest that increasingly the private life insurance industry is 
playing a substantial role in retirement provisions. Although, equity held in life 
insurance as of 2005 still forms the smallest percentage as compared with other 
categories, it is by far the fastest growing segment and is well positioned to draw level 
with other forms of financial assets due to the aggressive marketing and sales tactics 
employed by the life insurance sales force, but also because the State has sought to 
promote and legitimize the life insurance/financial services industry as a 
complimentary arm to the CPF system.  
Hence, this chapter has examined how within the context of a decade of 
economic uncertainty, the State has embarked on a two-pronged strategy of firstly 
increasing the degree of social control of individuals‟ finances especially for the lower 
classes; and secondly, to achieve a certain degree of social discipline beyond the CPF 
system, and to further stimulate the development of Singapore as a regional financial 
hub, the State has promoted and legitimized the financial services industry.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
“The thinking of the Government is that the best way to help a person is to 
make it possible for him to help himself.”166 
 
The key argument pursued in this dissertation has been that while the CPF is 
conventionally understood as a system of social welfare provision, its evolution has 
been primarily driven by economic and market development problems rather than just 
social welfare goals. This pool of collective savings has been coercively, ideologically 
and productively mobilized through the CPF system and has proven to be a very 
useful mechanism for stimulating growth in various sectors of the economy and to 
soak up unemployment. For example, chapter 3 shows that the expansion of the CPF 
system into the arena of housing provisions was an attempt to utilize the collective 
savings of the nation to create mass employment opportunities through a boom in the 
construction industries; while chapter 4 examines the utilization of the CPF as a 
national wage management mechanism, and the creation of a national investment 
reserve fund by borrowing from collective CPF savings. Chapter 5 and 6 have 
similarly examined the strategies and rationalities involved in channelling portions of 
CPF savings into developing Singapore as a regional financial hub.  
 Along the same train of thought, this dissertation has sought to highlight that the 
CPF system is not a static institution but rather a dynamic and malleable bureaucratic 
instrument. Through an exploration of the formation and subsequent evolution of the 
CPF system from 1955 to present, the earlier chapters demonstrate that the CPF 
system was not established with its present reach and ambition, but rather grew and 
evolved into its present form as a creative governmental response to the various 
economic and to a lesser extent demographical challenges through the decades. A key 
principle in any regulatory changes has been that reformulations in policies have been 
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intentionally pursued in a gradual and controlled fashion in order to mitigate societal 
disorder. The Minimum Sum Scheme and the recent implementation of the CPF Life 
is a case in point as the minimum sum has been gradually increased over the past two 
decades to finally establish a form of „total control‟ over members‟ CPF savings, 
especially for the lower classes. Additionally, through the examination of enforcement 
and surveillance procedures practiced in the earlier decades, an important insight from 
these chapters for nation-states considering a reformulation of existing social security 
arrangements is that the CPF system‟s present consensus and approval is not to be 
taken for granted, but rather that it has been actively pursued and bureaucratically 
constructed. The point to note is that commentators should be cautioned against 
assuming that the present CPF model is only possible in a small city-state like 
Singapore, but to understand that the CPF system took more than five decades of 
development to reach its present form. 
While the model of welfare capitalism in America has been built at least partly 
on the ideological foundations of Keynesian economics which places an 
“overwhelming emphasis on the increase of national purchasing power resulting from 
government expenditure, which is financed by loans” (Galbraith 1987: 22); Singapore 
has not rejected the significance and necessity of governmental intervention, but 
rather it has rejected the Keynesian basis of deficit financing through foreign loans. 
Instead, through the CPF system, and consistent fiscal budgetary surpluses, Singapore 
has instead placed an emphasis on financing expenditure and investments through 
savings at both the individual and collective level. Noting the context of the current 
global economic crisis, the premise of economic growth fuelled by easy credit and 
financial innovation has capitulated in spectacular fashion, and the current crisis 
experienced in America would once again shift a positive and admirable stance back 
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towards the Asian model. In particular, a thorough study of the CPF system does offer 
insights into building a fiscally sustainable model of social and economic 
development.  
While developments in the CPF system has been primarily motivated by market 
development problems, it has not failed in achieving social welfare goals. In stark 
contrast to the situation in 1967 where 74 percent of CPF members had balances of 
less than $1,000, and that 58 percent had less than $500
167
; By the end of 2007, 67.4% 
or approximately two-thirds of active CPF members had at least $50,000 in regrossed 
balances
168
 in their CPF accounts, with 36.7% of them accumulating more than 
$150,000 in regrossed balances. This is a laudable accomplishment even accounting 
for inflation, especially since regrossed balances does not account for capital gains 
from appreciating property values. (It is not uncommon especially for early buyers of 
properties to have property values that have more than tripled their nominal monies 
withdrawn under CPF housing schemes) Hence, even though the CPF system does 
have its critics especially with regards to its adequacy in retirement provisions, this 
must however take into account the high level of home ownership and the recent 
availability of reverse mortgage through the Lease Buyback Scheme. By 2000, 
Singapore‟s home ownership percentage had reached 90 percent, with 85 percent 
being home owners through public housing schemes. In comparison, Hong Kong‟s 
home ownership percentage was only 52 percent, while South Korea‟s was 75 percent 
(Lee 2003: 100). Additionally, on the average in 2009, Singapore households were 
sitting comfortably on six times more assets than liabilities which meant that for every 
$1 of debt they owed in mortgages or loans, households owned $6 in assets such as 
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 SLAD. Vol. 26, 14 November 1967, Col 370-371 
168
 Regrossed balances include amounts withdrawn under Investment, Education, Residential 
Properties, Non-Residential Properties and Public Housing Schemes as at end of period. 
Singapore, CPF, CPF Annual Report 2007. Pg 100. 
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stocks and property. In Singapore, for every $1 of liabilities held last year, households 
had $1.13 in cash deposits; in contrast, US households only had 50 cents of cash 
deposits for every $1 in liabilities and UK households 73 cents
169
. This has been made 
possible due not just to the coercive aspect of the CPF, but also the active ideological 
promotion of „financial planning‟ by the State as suggested in Chapter 6.   
It is recognized that the above statistics on assets and liabilities might be skewed 
by a small proportion of extremely wealthy citizens, nevertheless, although the PAP 
State has been in stern opposition of direct welfare programs, empirical reality reveals 
that the State does in fact provide generous subsidies to aid lower classes in leveling 
up. These which amount to about $70,000 per Singaporean ($35,000 in housing, 
$25,000 for 10 years of primary and secondary education, and about $10,000 in 
healthcare subsidies)
170
 apart from periodic top-ups into CPF accounts and cash 
handouts. For the minority who are living along poverty lines, in order to prevent an 
expectation of dependence on the state and to balance individual responsibility with 
state welfarism, the PAP has instead preferred to primarily channel financial 
assistance through non-governmental welfare agencies supported by private donations 
and government grants, though it does provide a small amount of direct monetary 
grants to people who have no means of financial support and to those in low-income 
families (Tan 2004: 128).  
The CPF system is thus an important component within the overall ideological 
framework which consistently and forcefully imposes the discipline of self-reliance. 
Collectively, this has thus far resulted in an enviable system of social and economic 
development which has proven to be fiscally sustainable and socially beneficial to the 
vast majority, especially in terms of housing provision (Chua 1997). In short, the 
                                                          
169
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extensive social control of personal finance has ultimately been socially and 
economically productive thus far. This has thus resulted in the present acceptance and 
taken-for-granted attitude towards the great degree of social control as exercised 
through the CPF system.  
Nevertheless, in light of the characterization of the CPF as a “property-based 
welfare system” (Lee 2007: 15) and the recent availability of reverse mortgage 
schemes, the continued viability of the CPF system largely depends on preserving a 
growing economy which is able to provide employment for the present working 
generation, and to sustain a stable and growing property market for adequate 
retirement provisions of retirees. Additionally, despite the impressive 
accomplishments thus far, issues of transparency and accountability, especially in 
regards to the low interest rates as compared to the investment returns of Singapore‟s 
sovereign wealth funds, remain a blemish to the CPF system. 
Further Research 
 
I acknowledge that while the primary strength of this dissertation has been in its 
depth and detail in a historical analysis of the CPF system in Singapore; its primary 
limitation has been the lack of attention towards adopting a comparative approach 
with other countries. As such, a particularly fruitful avenue for future research would 
focus on further developing a detailed historical and comparative analysis of the 
emergence and evolution of social security systems within the East Asian region. This 
would contribute towards the comparative study of „western‟ and „eastern‟ models of 
welfare capitalism, and contribute towards a formulation of a model of welfare 
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Appendix B: Summary of Enforcement Proceedings from 1977-1987 
 
- Denotes that there is no available data 
*Denotes the number of employers who were formally warned    
















































































30,082 32,274 4,568 0.43 6.58 
